NEW TIMES

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A SOVIET WEEKLY OF WORLD AFFAIRS

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A socialist choice for the capital?



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NO COMMENT

LEONID TISHKOV

A SOVIET WEEKLY
OF WORLD AFFAIRS

NEW TIMES

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From our mailbag

■ I am one of those who by virtue of destiny and our state system became for two years a military builder.

I am writing to you under the influence of the article by Ilya Gerol, titled "Don't dig trenches in your own home" (No. 18/91). Indeed, generals must jingle with their medals at parades, and not on the rostrums during rallies. General Makashov wished to become president. Of course, in his political struggle he made his pitch to the army. During the referendum on the creation of the post of the president of the RSFSR, the army top brass sought to make servicemen vote "against." From Samara through military-bureaucratic channels began to come instructions to secure a negative result of the referendum in the troops.

Political departments began to bustle as political workers with big stars hurried to preach that the post of the president was not needed. As they saw it, referendum was the sure-fire way to stop the most probable presidential contender. The result of the referendum has turned out to be a positive one. The general did not lose his heart and at the drop of a hat changed his strategy.

They brought to our military construction detachment printed forms for the "collection of signatures of voters in support of the candidate to the post of the RSFSR President Makashov Albert Mikhailovich, born in 1938, the commander of the Urals-Volga River area military district, nominated at the meeting of officers of the headquarters and the Urals-Volga River area military district administration of the city of Samara." We also received an oral instruction from the command to collect on that petition a certain number of signatures. The indicated figure, though, was some hundred people over the effectives. What could we do? Go to the city and urge the civilians to put their signatures. We were given 24 hours to fulfil this task. Many officers took that venture as an order and displayed maximum of zeal. Thank God that such colonels account for a small percentage of Russia's population.

O. Voronov
Sverdlovsk Region, USSR

■ It is common knowledge that he who doesn't want to hear is hopelessly deaf. This is the situation with a part of our mass media that comes out under the banner of the "defence of the socialist option" and does not want to hear about the tragedy of the residents of Armenian villages in Azerbaijan.

The publications that stand up for the priority of universal human values in the given question have adopted the position of Aleksei Suvorin's newspaper *New Times*, known in pre-revolutionary Russia for its unscrupulousness that as long as 100 years ago was spreading the most outrageous ideas about the Armenian question.

Although the screams of innocent victims were drowned in the roar of tanks, thunder of guns and explosions of rockets, they have been heard outside Azerbaijan. And the *New Times* magazine was among those who heard them.

Perhaps someone will think the article by Marina Shakina (No. 19/91) is too reserved. But one can understand the reserve of a political observer in dealing with such a complex question. It is more difficult to understand the position of those who try to justify violence against civilians and ignore evident facts.

When the persecution by Mikhail Katkov of the peoples dependent on Russia was at its height, Emperor Alexander II deemed it necessary to point out to the "defender" of the empire that such conduct was inadmissible. The emperor said that one

The revival of my village depends on Germans

■ My native village Ust-Zolikha is becoming world-famous. You have published the photograph of the destroyed Lutheran church situated there as an illustration for the material by K. Isakov about the congress of Germans living in the area along the Volga River (No. 10/91).

I am Russian and was brought to the village by my parents right after the war, and this is where I spent my childhood and youth. I shall always have a profound respect for the German people. I used to play among the remains of the gardens and plantations created some time ago by Germans, and from the ruins of the German buildings I got an idea about their good quality in bygone days! I liked the convenient and practical lay-out of the village and got a notion about the life of its former residents.

Everything that was built there is going to ruin, but the traces of German civilization are ineradicable. What we strangers have created there on the ruins of our own making give one an opportunity to compare — and the result is not in our favour. My village is in a state of decay and very little has been left from comfortable streets: maybe only the sorrowful hills on the spot of the destroyed buildings. There are no gardens left. And the life continues to be poorly organized. The new buildings are put up helter-skelter. My ill-starred fellow-villagers have contrived to build one street on soggy terrain (how could they find such a place in an arid steppe!) and another on the old cemetery (and this is with the famous Saratov spaces all around the place!).

The village is inhabited by people who landed there by chance. There are many old people with no place to move to, and young people are striving for the already established well-being and move out.

But this is my native land, and I have no objection to coming back here. But I make my return conditional on the return of Germans. It is only with their help that one can revive that once rich and beautiful village, as well as this land as a whole. And among those who will stand to gain from this will also be the local population. But at present, being under the strong influence of the district and province officials, they don't have an opinion of their own about the return of Germans. By putting obstacles in the way to the revival of German villages, the authorities pursue the goals

Generals should jingle their medals at parades, and not at rallies

In one hundred years, *New Times* has changed a lot

Advice of a housekeeper from the CPSU Central Committee



Drawing by Sergei Kupria

should not cast people's descent in their teeth. Representatives of any nationality can be loyal subjects.

At the height of the Armenmian crisis in the 1890s, in order to look as a humane monarch into the eyes of Europe, the Turkish Sultan enacted a farce of chasing the criminals who had robbed the Armenian villages.

The forces that have provoked the present outburst of violence around Karabakh don't have in the least measure the philanthropy of Alexander II, and are not even capable of formal admission of the fact of violence. Having believed in perestroika, the Armenian people have become a victim of the most shameless deception.

V. Khachaturov
Krasnodar, USSR

■ I want to give the thumbs up to the pamphlet by my beloved Leonid Likhodeev, titled *What's the man eating, Dad?* (No. 14/91). No amount of whining, moralizing or demagogical accusations of "fanning confrontational feelings" should deter the magazine and its authors from writing on that truly most acute theme.

I am talking about the moral impudence of party and nomenklatura big shots.

To further develop this theme, I want to draw the attention of *New Times* to the publication in issue No. 15 of the CPSU Central Committee weekly *Glasnost*. They have introduced in it a section which is very topical for this day and age, "The advice of a housekeeper," the contents of which looks, in my view, like a true mockery of the people. Here are two pieces of advice from a housekeeper from the CPSU Central Committee.

"Buy meat, cereals and sunflower oil of lower quality: they are not only cheaper, but are also better for your health." "Try when you can to avoid using public transportation – you will save money, it is good for your health and prevents you from catching the flue." How do you like it? Isn't it lovely material for a topical satire?

Sergei Novoselov
***Lesnaya Gazeta* correspondent in Buryatia and Chita Region, assistant of a people's deputy of the USSR in the 517th Soviet national territorial electoral district**
Ulan-Ude

■ *New Times* magazine published a letter by the reader V. Malakhin (No. 19/91), who calls Moscow State Institute of International Relations the "caste," "elite," and "Nomenklatura" institute of higher education, characterizing perestroika in our institute as a "myth." The author writes: "It is not true that some serious changes have taken place there in the procedure of staffing the student body..."

In fact, Malakhin accuses the rector of the institute as the author of the article (No. 41/90) of deliberately giving misinformation to the public as to the situation in Moscow State Institute of International Relations.

Lately, the work of the institute with all its positive and negative sides has on more than one occasion been covered by the central and Moscow press and television. Since it is, probably, not enough, I invite V. Malakhin and a representative of the magazine to keep an eye personally, from beginning to end on how the next admission to the institute proceeds. Your representatives will have access to all materials they would like to see, and will be able to be present at the meetings of the selection and appeals committees, and to talk to the entrants and their parents. Your critical remarks and advice will be useful for the institute and the ongoing process of renewal in it. The institute administration and newspaper *Mezhdunarodnik* will render them all necessary assistance.

Andrei Stepanov
Moscow, USSR

***Compiled by* Tatiana Chernova**

hat have nothing to do with the interests of the people. The actions of the local authorities are supported by the naction of the central government, which give rise to loubts as to a speedy solution of the German question. One can understand people who are fainting under the veight of the numerous problems that have befallen hem, and, consequently, I hope the German people vill forgive me for saying this, the question about the estoration of the German autonomy is not on their genda. But to understand the troubles of a strange eople one also needs some reserve of morals and indness. We have so far failed to understand that together with Germans we will solve our problems aster.

And what about Germans themselves? They lack persistence and a strong desire to pitch their tent on their native land, they lack the courage of pioneers. Germans and Russians are brothers in misfortune, they both suffered a lot in the past. Today we have a last chance o revive a unique community of people.

Unfortunately, today Germans from the area along he Volga River spend all their efforts on political struggle and the creation of an apparatus for work with the central authorities. What the Germans are doing now – creating the autonomy from the top (and only then do they want to get down to the revival of the native land) – resembles very much a marriage in absentia, when the partners do not know each other by sight. The tactics must be changed. They must make the acquaintance of the local population, without forgetting that they are also facing problems, even if they are not as grave as the Germans. And this will be possible if they begin right away to develop and populate that territory. Only then will we be in a position to revive our native land.

I am sure that my fellow countrymen still have the kindness and the breadth of Russian nature. They will give their blessing to the German autonomy. If today Germans begin to return to our land, tomorrow the autonomy will become the reality.

Vyacheslav Tormozov,
director of a plant
Bratsk, USSR

RUSSIA

People's President

"Is presidency for Russia the final victory or the beginning of a new way?"

Forever together?..

NT parliamentary correspondent, **Gennady Ariyevich,** asked this guestion of People's Deputies of Russia and guests of the Congress on Boris Yeltsin's inauguration day.

IVAN SILAYEV, Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Russian Republic

This is a historic day for all Russia. People's hopes for the future and a better life are connected with it. There are difficulties today, of course, and there will be more of them. But presidency was introduced to cope wich the difficulties. The main problem confronting us is the psychological inflexibility of the people who have lived under the totalitarian system for 73 years.

GRIGORY YAVLINSKY, economist

The event that we witness today inspires hope for the future. We are witnessing the formation of a basis upon which our programme of economic reforms will be implemented. The interaction between Yeltsin and Gorbachov is one of the elements of this basis. The West will be able to help us only if we succeed in gradually transforming this country. However, there are so many problems that the reform may get bogged down in them. We are to solve a hard problem, but there is no other way.

GLEB YAKUNIN, Committee for Freedom of Conscience, Confessions, and Charity

With God's help democracy and a normal free market economy will lead our country towards prosperity and well-being. However, no economy will save us without a moral and spiritual renaissance of our people. The main obstacle to such a renaissance is the overt and covert resistance of the apparat, which is still powerful, especially in more remote places. Much will depend on the future of the Communist Party. If the advocates of reform and democracy prevail, the CP will cease to exist and will turn into a social democratic party. If the reactionary forces take the upper hand and

The Chairman is also needed...

Sergei Kovalyov, Chairman of the Human Rights Committee, comments on the situation around the election of the Chairman of the Supreme Soviet of Russia:

This is something that often happens in many parliaments. But it illustrates the Russian parliament's lack of experience and low professional level. It is obvious that neither of the two candidates can win the majority of the votes. The rivalry between the candidates and several rounds of voting have highlighted our inability to seek compromises.

It is clear for me that a compromise can be reached by different ways. For example, people could be nominated who would suit the opposition as well as the nominators. There is such an opportunity, but we are faced with the consequences of personal ambitions and, unfortunately, behind-the-scenes intrigues. Besides, we are thinking in a characteristicaly Soviet way, wishing that the one whom we like best became elected... The result may turn out to be frustrating. The position of the Chairman of the Supreme Soviet and his team is acquiring a special importance – it is a part of the forming system of checks and balances which secures the much-spoken-about democracy. Now that we have formed a strong executive branch, this is a most important process.

phase out the reformers, this will not be too bad either: The Communist Party will isolate itself from the masses and its political demise will be a matter of a little time. Today, the Communist Party and the administrative structures it created are an obstacle on the way to democracy.

ROSTISLAV TIKHONOV, professor, Committee for Science and Public Education

Another remarkable page has been written in the history of Russia, and it is still too difficult to duly evaluate the significance of this occassion. The most exciting development, which produced a lasting impression on me, is the open and honest statement that the way we chose back in 1917 has proved to be leading nowhere. This acknowledgement sums up all the political disputes and battles. No matter whether people like it or not, we must close this issue, and now we have legislatively solved the question.

However, we have only stepped over the threshold. A lot of difficulties are still ahead of us. One problem, which is especially alarming, is as follows: shortly before the beginning of the Congress the deputies, Communist Party members, people who do not belong to the CPSU, and people like me who have turned in their party cards, received by special delivery a letter from the CPSU Central Committee containing an insistent call not to adopt the law on privatization, in other words, to block one of the fundamental legislative acts defining the forms of ownership in Russia. The letter was rather harshly worded ("the generations to come will condemn you for having sold the country down the river") and signed: "CPSU Central Committee". The fact that such an appeal was issued on the eve of the Congress, at which the deputies were to adopt the law, to inaugurate the President and to embark on the path of reform, makes one question the sincereity of the congratulations extended by the President of the USSR, who is also the General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee. Many communists who received that letter occupy important positions, serving as factory directors, chief engineers, etc. These are the people who had been picked up by the Communist nomenklatura. The letter will unmistakably have the intended effect on them. The heated disputes and differences in every city, town, and village are the main difficulties. As a representative of the town of Kovrov, where most factories and plants belong to the military industrial complex, I am well acquainted with these problems and difficulties.

YEVGENY AMBARTSUMOV, Committee for International Affairs and Foreign Economic Relations

Boris Yeltsin will only suceed if he resolutely carries out the anticipated reforms. There should be no ambiguity, for the difference between the Yavlinsky plan and the Pavlov plan is obvious. The Nine Plus One Agreement may be interpreted in a way that will bind Yeltsin to endorse the economic recovery programme proposed by the federal government. Yeltsin does not seem to think so, but the situation as a whole may compel him to endorse the Union programme. On the other hand, Russia cannot implement the plan of reforms in isolation from the rest of the Nine Plus One Agreement, which contains political traps.

We have learned recently that President Gorbachev lifted the state of emergency earlier imposed in two Armenian-populated districts of Azerbaijan. One of the districts was formed as a result of the merger of two districts in the context of the state of emergency. Now the Azerbaijani authorities are deporting Armenians "on a voluntary basis", allowing pogroms, beatings, and human rights violations. Russia's moral obligation is to step in and defend the oppressed Armenian population, first because it is subject to humiliation, and secondly, because about 200 years ago the Armenian population of Nagorno-Kakabakh opted to join Russia, not Azerbaijan.

The Nine Plus One Agreement has one more trap. Armenia has not joined the Agreement, and Russia and Azerbaijan are formally allies and Russia has to support the war Azerbaijan is waging against Armenia. This is dangerous for Yeltsin and for Russia and for the entire world community. This must not be ignored.

SERGEI BABURIN, Chairman of the Subcommittee for Legislation

This event is undoubtedly a major landmark in the history of Russia, the whole country, and Boris Yeltsin's political biography. However, this inauguration puts an end to all credits to the President of Russia. The time of promises is over, now promises have to be turned to reality. It is important that the Supreme Soviet of the Russian Federation and the President of Russia work together in the name of the benefit of the whole people. This is so important that all political forces must start seeking common points. No confrontation between the President and the parliament can be permitted to begin, but nor can the parliament be permitted to become a pocket parliament of the President.

RAMAZAN ABDULATIPOV, Chairman of the Council of Nationalities

It is a good beginning. God willing, the continuation will be as good. The first problem is the division of legislative and executive power. This is a rather painful process, because the two branches are closely interconnected. Another problem is that Boris Yeltsin must continue his current policy for concord and consolidation. As a frequent opponent of Boris Yeltsin, I am pleasantly surprised to see Yeltsin resolutely getting rid of his former confrontational tendencies. I hope he will continue his line.

Another problem is people's great expectations connected with the promises we were generously making in the heat of the election campaign. People want a speedy improvement in living standards – in a year's time or even earlier. That is why we must teach the people to be realistic, to work hard without counting on miracles.

There is one more problem – the confused relations between Russia and the centre and Russia and the republics. Much has been done in this area already, but there is still a lot we must do.

One more consideration. I am sure that the President must be free of any political affiliations or influences. The presidential power belongs to the executive branch – it has a lot of things to attend to.

ALEXANDER TIKHOMIROV, TV observer, chairman of the deputies' group "Glasnost"

This is a solemn and historic day. I am not really fond of florid language and I have been somewhat appalled by what I think is excessive solemnity at this ceremony. Nonetheless, the emergence of the first

popularly elected President of Russia is the first step towards Russia's acquisition of real statehood.

However, if we are not able to change anything in the economic sphere, if we do not manage to reverse our sliding into the abyss of economic crisis, all this solemnity will backfire on the President and all of us. That is why now that we have a strong executive branch we must start carrying out cardinal economic reforms. Privatization is necessary, but it is a lengthy process. Today we need real freedom, independence, self-financing, and self-sufficiency of enterprises. In other words, we must create a mechanism that will encourage people to work better.

ANATOLY MEDVEDEV, Committee for Mass Media and Public Relations

Today is the great day of the affirmation of a new Russia! The main thing is the beginning of new work, rather difficult at that. One such difficulty, in my opinion, is the dramatic lack of democratic culture and enterprising people in Russia. Another difficulty is still the danger of Russia's disintegration as a result of political intrigues in some territories and autonomous republics. This danger is embedded in the draft of the new Union Treaty – God forbid that this treaty is enacted in its present form. We are for a Union, but not the Union of the ruins of the former federation.

MIKHAIL MOLOSTVOV, Human Rights Committee

A new page is being opened in the history of Russia. We hope that popularly elected Yeltsin will become a true President of Russia. People are aware of the difficulties awaiting us. It is impossible to get out of the hole we are all in in just one leap. The creation of a free market will take great effort. Russia will need a new generation of people who know how to work, how to establish contacts, how to do fair business. Ministries and departments, especially those assosiated with the military complex, will have to reduce their ambitions. A reduction of the military burden will facilitate the solution of our problems and will improve the life of common people. The enormously rich organizations like the Children's Fund (I am not sure whether it is still named after Lenin or has been renamed in honour of its omnipotent chairman, Albert Likhanov) and the CPSU (if it wants to survive as a parliamentary party) must share their property and their funds. The ruling elite must understand that in a crisis-ridden country, those in power must behave more modestly.

Rev. VLADIMIR ALEXEYEV, Father Superior of the Ulijanovsk church complex under construction

Our expectations have come true, our faith in Russia has been justified. I believe that the Russian President who has assumed tremendous responsibily for Russia will create a brighter future for Russia. The principal task is the restoration of the spiritual health. The constructive spirit is what the state and man derive strength from. If Russia becomes inspired with the constructive spirit, everything will be all right. This will not happen tommorrow, this process requires much time. Boris Yeltsin has never promised an improvement around the corner, he has called on the people to work hard. And the Patriarch said that people will have to learn how to work.

Gorbachev goes centre again

After London the President will have to deal with the Pavlov problem

Igor Bunin, Mark Urnov

The political armistice between Gorbachev and Yeltsin following the Novo-Ogarevo agreement has enabled both leaders to solve a number of serious problems. Gorbachev has succeeded in stopping the coalminers' strike, suppressing the opposition in the CPSU Central Committee, crushing the conspiracy of the Soyuz faction in the USSR Supreme Soviet, and sharply broadening his room for manoeuvre.

After the November 1990 "turn" in the wake of which the 500 Days programme was buried and economic reform actually blocked, the President of the USSR leaned primarily on the Party upper crust, top bureaucrats in the USSR government, the Army-KGB bloc and members of the USSR parliament. On June 21, 1991, however, Gorbachev finally broke with the Soyuz parliamentary group, accusing its leaders of attempts "to destabilize cooperation among the republics, the Supreme Soviet and the President." ...Gorbachev's readiness to satisfy the political appetites of "three or four" parties, existing in the CPSU, simultaneously has obviously diminished. He suggested that the CPSU be social-democratized, and that the conservatives and reactionaries be offered the alternative of accepting its new programme or resigning their membership in it.

Upon breaking with his former allies, Gorbachev has got himself new ones, most of them the leaders of several constituent republics and "new democrats" of the movement for democratic reforms. Having "distanced themselves from the 'November turn'" (to quote Shevardnadze) the democrats in the CPSU began to unite after the change of course and launched a new movement under the aegis of Gorbachev (or with his approval, at least).

"This is Russia"

As a result of all these processes, a rigid "bi-polar" political structure based on confrontation between two blocs – "communists" and "democrats" – has been replaced by a more flexible "multipolar" system open to various unions. The Novo-Ogarevo agreement has enabled Gorbachev to move from the psychologically and politically awkward position of the leader of the Right-wing conservative bloc to his favourite position – the middle of the political spectrum.

Making peace with Yeltsin has become Gorbachev's most important achievement, however. It was Russia's President who had the draft Union Treaty adopted by the Russian Federation's Supreme Soviet by warning that if the deputies rejected it, the result would be "a political collapse and destabilization of the entire political situation in the country." It was Yeltsin who said he was prepared to support Gorbachev at the national presidential election if the latter carried on democratic reforms. The alternative draft Union Treaty, tabled by the working group of the commission of the Congress of the People's Deputies of the Russian Federation, rejects the principle of a direct and nationwide presidential election and suggests that the President be elected in Parliament, by an MP majority vote. This would make Gorbachev's re-election dead certain. On the other hand, it would make the central government much less legitimate than those of the republics.

Over the past few months, Yeltsin has also benefitted from the merits of the "9+1" agreement. It afforded him the short-cut to the post of Russia's President and softened the conflict with the autonomous republics. Even the problem of Tatarstan has lost its acuteness. According to Grigory Revenko, an adviser of Gorbachev's, no one will sign a treaty with President Mintimer Shaimiyev of Tatarstan because his stance is anything but constructive. Thanks to the "9+1" agreement, the process of the republics taking over the enterprises once subordinated to the central authorities is going rather smoothly. Gor-



bachev even went so far as suspending a resolution of the USSR Cabinet of Ministers which impinged on the economic interests of the Russian Federation.

The first steps have been taken towards the division of powers between the Centre and the republics in the law-enforcement sphere: the Russian Federation is setting up a state security committee of its own, and the military councils of the USSR Armed Forces will include, from now on, presidents of the republics, chairmen of the supreme soviets or of their presidiums rather than secretaries of the central committees of the republics' Communist parties; standing conferences of the USSR's and the sovereign republics' ministers of foreign affairs are on. In other words, the statehood of the Russian Federation and other republics which have signed the Novo-Ogarevo agreement is consolidating much faster now.

However, what really matters is not, and even not so much, what the Novo-Ogarevo agreement has brought, but what Yeltsin's long-term strategic objectives are. Having become a builder of Russia's new statehood he has realized, judging by everything, that the disintegration of the USSR would inevitably lead to such a feudal division of the country which, in its turn, would cause Russia, too, to fall apart. For its part, the central government recognized the need for Russia's integrity and for the interdependence of the interests of the Russian Federation and the USSR. Georgi Shakhnazarov, Gorbachev's political adviser, says that "there is no such thing as the centre separated from Russia and opposed to it" and that national statehood "is Russia". It would be only logical to expect that in the long run the new Russian political elite will seek to take over the federal centre in the state formation which is to replace the USSR. Yeltsin seems to have arrived to this conclusion much earlier than the "romantic democrats" did (the latter, until recently, toyed with the idea of setting up fifty sovereign states on the territory of the USSR).

Besides, the record of the last year's economic development has shown that the hopes of any republic striking out on its own economically are ungrounded. "To say that any Republic will abruptly switch over to an independent economic policy is nothing but downright politicking," Nazarbayev said. This means that the Centre's participation in building up the free market economy is inevitable. Finally, it is only Gorbachev who can keep the Army-KGB bloc from using the strategy of tension, the "pinpricks" tactics and the show of force. When the Cabinet of Ministers "went into hysterics" (as Gorbachev put it) in the Supreme Soviet and demanded extra powers for Valentin Pavlov, the USSR President just raised his voice a little which proved enough to suppress the "mutiny" and to call the Prime Minister and the three most powerful ministers – Yazov, Kryuchkov and Pugo – to attention. Consequently Yeltsin cannot but regard Gorbachev as the only figure capable of protecting the emergent democracy from the reactionary generals and orthodox communists.

A nominal president or a condominium?

If Gorbachev does not confine himself to closing down the bankrupt enterprise called the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, but takes the initiative in building up a state of an entirely new type, in creating a single economic entity ready to go free-market and open to cooperation with the West, and if he keeps the reactionary military in check, then the prospect of the republics outweighing the centre can be ruled out for a long time to come. Throughout the transitional period of reform the Centre, headed by Gorbachev and Yeltsin, will be able to maintain a balance between the strong republics and a strong enough centre provided, of course, that the latter keeps carrying out changes for the better and that the two leaders cooperate and divide spheres of influence.

After his inauguration, Yeltsin has moved his headquarters to one of Gorbachev's Kremlin offices, which symbolizes the condominium now being established on the territory of the USSR. Under the circumstances, the President of the USSR is to reserve a sharply defined limited sphere of executive activity. Even foreign policy will be kind of "two-storey," with Yeltsin actually having the right to the "second signature." In the defence sphere, the centre wil keep its control over nuclear weapons, but according to Yeltsin, "no one will press the button without Russia's consent."

Within the framework of this arrangement, Gorbachev may act as an arbiter, especially in view of the fact that some of the republics will, for fear of a stronger Russia, stick to the centre and to Gorbachev, with whom they identify the centre. The tandem will benefit enormously, of course, from massive foreign economic aid, if the West opts to give it.

"Come and rule us"

Western aid, its recipients (the centre or the republics), its likely scale, character and forms (credits or investments), determine the alignment of political forces in the country, as did the attitude to Article 6 of the Constitution and to the elections of the country's president in early 1990; to the republics' sovereignty in the summer of 1990; to the 500 Days project in the autumn of 1990; to the Gorbachev-Yeltsin conflict and the coalminers' strike in March-April 1991.

As a matter of fact, all the influential members of the Soviet political elite are morally prepared to go overseas and ask for heavy investments in the Soviet economy. "It is impossible to reform our society if isolated from others, in earnest," said V. Fokin, Prime Minister of the Ukraine. In the upper crust, there is, it is true, a group of "the genteel poor" of Pavlov type, outwardly demonstrating their unwillingness to queue for foreign aid along with Israel and Nicaragua. Actually, this unwillingness comes from the man who has dreamt up the story about "a conspiracy of international banks aimed at destabilizing the situation in society and overthrowing Gorbachev." Behind this one can see Pavlov's resentment at not being invited along abroad for negotiations with the West on loans.

As a partner of the West, Gorbachev, a Nobel Prize winner and the author of "new thinking," which has helped save Eastern Europe from communism, paved the way for the unification of Germany, made it possible to sign so many agreements and to resolve so many conflicts in the flashpoints of the earth, is simply indispensable. His prestige in Western public opinion is as high as ever, his authority among the leaders of the Big Seven is indisputable. Who of the Soviet politicians can quietly depend on the personal solidarity of Chancellor Kohl, let alone "credits, commodity exchanges, project realization"? For the sake of whom else would Kohl agree in advance to phone the other colleagues in the Group of Seven? Clearly, Gorbachev is the ideal mediator between the Nine and Group of Seven.

But how rewarding will this visit be? More likely than not, its results will turn out to be most modest. Largely for the reason that Gorbachev, in an attempt to be on the safe side again, and seeking to preserve for himself the political structure in the shape of a national ministerial bureaucracy, took along to London not a radical programme, but a hybrid hatched by economist Abalkin – a cross between the Yavlinsky programme and Pavlov's anti-crisis measures. The West's restrained reaction promptly showed in the pronouncements by American, Canadian and Japanese representatives. Those pronouncements made clear that no big money was forthcoming.

Such a finale of the London Summit, combined with an obvious impossibility of an early signing of the Union Treaty, would change the precarious balance of forces within the Novo-Ogarevo alliance – and not in the USSR President's favour, either.

As a result, back from London, Gorbachev will again face the need to choose. This time his choice will hinge upon the fate of the Pavlov cabinet. As Yavlinsky aptly put it, "no programme will solve the crucial economic problems of finance, banking and, consequently, ruble conversion for as long as Valentin Pavlov has the money."

In May Yavlinsky, a "romantic," expected Pavlov to be called to stern account. Such a development cannot be ruled out, of course. However, Gorbachev will venture to dismiss the Pavlov cabinet and thus to break with the forces which stand behind the Premier, and to throw himself upon the mercy of the republics, only if he gets from the Group of Seven full guarantees that he is the only possible contractor for them. Or else under a powerful pressure from the Nine headed by Yeltsin and Nazarbayev.

Left to shift for himself, Gorbachev will try, more likely than not, to play for time and to seek palliatives: to replace Pavlov by Shcherbakov, to offer Yavlinsky the role Abalkin has played in the Ryzhkov cabinet, and the like. Probably he will try to set up an inter-republican economic committee without liquidating the Pavlov cabinet. Such a situation, reminiscent of that which followed the rejection of the 500 Days programme, may cause another political storm which will jeopardize both the Gorbachev-Yeltsin condominium now in the making and the further progress towards the "strong republics – temporarily strong centre" alignment. ■

On June 13, as on every weekend, a report was made: at sunrise armed troops raided the Armenian villages Erkedj, Buzlukh, and Manashid in the former Shaumyanovsky district of Azerbaijan. In reply to an address of the Armenian government the Union MVD, KGB, and Ministry of Defence unanimously said that they knew nothing of the events and had not been involved in the raid. The attackers wore black uniform and demanded that the inhabitants quickly abandon the villages. The villagers assert that otherwise they were threatened with physical violence.

The following day, units of the interior MVD troops of the USSR and the Fourth Army, along with the Azerbaijani OMON, began passport checks in the villages. The checks were preceded by preparatory artillery fire, as had been the case before. All the attempts of the government of the Armenian republic to get in touch with the President of the USSR proved useless. The inhabitants of the villages, fearing a repetition of the Ghetashen tragedy, hid in the woods and in the regional centre, Shaumyanovsk.

The plan of action against Armenian villages in Azerbaijan has been worked out to the minutest detail and is always one and the same. First, there's artillery fire, then the village is locked up by interior troops,

A journalist

The Fund for the Protection of Glasnost calls for the release of a journalist. Vardan Oganesyan has already spent more than two months in prison in the Azerbaijani city of Gyandj

Vardan Oganesyan, a free-lance journalist in the Yerevan bureau of the Information Agency Novosti, was the only journalist who witnessed to the operations of the army, MVD and OMON, which took place from April 30 to May 6 in the Armenian village of Ghetashen in Azerbaijan. On April 30, Vardan was caught in a raid for the first time. He presented his passport and the certification issued to him in Yerevan, which proved that he was a free-lance correspondent for IAN. The passport was returned to him, but the certification was not.

In spite of his youth – Vardan is only 23 years old – this is not his first trip to a trouble spot. When blood was shed in the Baltics in January, Vardan was in Moscow. He left immediately for Riga. He

Is this really a solution?

Another three Armenian villages in Azerbaijan which have been subjected to "passport checks" by the OMON, MVD troops, and the army. It seems that under the pretext of passport control and searches for fighters they are carrying out a systematic deportation

then the OMON arrive. The consequences of such actions in Ghetashen on April 30 and in Voskepar on May 6 are well known. In Erkedj on July 14, two people were killed and many more were wounded. During the second half of that day a similar operation began in Verishen. Erkedj came under fire for the second time on July 15, right after its residents returned home. They had had to leave during the first attack. Another two people were killed and seven wounded. Reports from Erkedj say that on July 16 gunships bombed the woods where the villagers were hiding.

The first, or May, chapter of this deportation has concluded de facto for the Armenians with forty dead, one hundred and twenty wounded, and five thousand new refugees deported from twenty villages in Artsakh and adjoining districts in Azerbaijan. Azerbaijan is saying nothing about its losses.

After May a kind of calm set in. The democratic press condemned the action of the army in Karabakh, and observers from human rights organizations went to the Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Region. Envoys from the Sakharov Congress were received by the Azerbaijani leaders. But even the most democratic perspective, condemning the outrage committed by the Azerbaijani OMON, appraised the role of the army as unseemly, sometimes shameful, but "accidental."

But July marked the beginning of a new chapter of the conflict. "Checks" proceeded in all five districts of the Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Region. It seems that these are plans whose implementation was merely interrupted. When the Armenian side spopke two months ago about "forceful eviction" and "requests about migration" signed under threat of death, someone took it as propaganda. The majority is under the opinion that in the Nagorn-Karabakh Autonomous Region there's a civil war going on. The expropriation of weapons from both the fighters and the population at large is considered to be the final result of the not always reasonable actions of the army.

The last events show that the only possible result of the action of all the military might in Azerbaijan can be the deportation of Armenians from Nagorno-Karabakh. It is now hard to explain the role of Union troops as accidental.

Politicians and journalists are of two opinions. First, that the centre was not a participant in the events in the Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Region. The second opinion is that the centre has found a common language with Azerbaijan, who participated in the Nine plus One agreement, and is supporting it against Armenia, who has alienated itself from the centre.

But it's possible that all is simpler – and more tragic. That which has taken place in the Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Region is the very attempt to resolve the Karabakh crisis which has been awaited for more than three years. After all, this government has never known any other "solution" to a nationality conflict. Is it true that now the only solution, which was so often employed in the past, is deportation? Do they really think that there's no other way to cut a knot?

However it is, voluntary or involuntary, passive or encouraging military action along the lines which Baku has insistently taken, the centre turns out to be instigating the internecine war. Times have changed, and war is not fought on territory dependent on Moscow, but between two sovereign republics. The new position of the centre requires that it find a new approach.

Irina Lagunina

in prison

worked with the film crew of Podnieks, and Slapiņš.

After they took away his certification, which proved that he was fulfilling an assignment for IAN, Vardan was left in a very difficult position. He had only his passport and his Yerevan residence permit, for which the Azerbaijani OMON could, in the best possible scenario, send him directly to jail, no questions asked. It occurred to Oganesyan to turn to the village Soviet and request that they issue him a certificate, stating that he resided in Ghetashen.

On May 4, during the second check, Vardan was detained by an army patrol. After he explained why he had been given a false certificate and requested that they take him to those in command, he was turned over to the Azerbaijani OMON. His camera and video camera were confiscated and the film exposed.

In the Prosecutor's Office of the Republic of Azerbaijan, they investigated at length whether or

not he was connected with the Armenian fighters. In the end, out of all the charges advanced, only one remained – the use of a false document, Article 194[1] of the Criminal Code of the Republic of Azerbaijan.

In the USSR, no one knew that the journalist had been detained – no one was allowed to see him. But the information seeped out to the West. The Bulgarian journalist Tsvetana Paskaleva sought to meet with the imprisoned Oganesyan and taped her conversation with him. She turned to the Fund for the Protection of Glasnost with a request to help her colleague, and her article appeared in *Moscow News*. Subsequently, contradictory information began to be received from Azerbaijan. On June 14, the Deputy Minister of Internal Affairs of Azerbaijan promised that within two days Oganesyan would be released. But the information from the Azerbaijani MVD did not confirm this – they did not let Oganesyan go.

After this, however, they let a lawyer see Vardan. Having returned from Azerbaijan, he filed an application to close the case, which was rejected by the investigative organs of the Republic of Azerbaijan.

There actually were grounds for discontinuing the case. First of all, lawyers contend, the certificate issued by the village Soviet was not that indicated in the article of the Criminal Code. The certificate did not give Vardan any rights or obligations. Second, they took away his journalist's certificate giving him some protection in a district where there was indeed military action.

Now the Fund for the Protection of Glasnost and the Committee for the Protection of Free Speech of the Journalists' Union of the USSR have appealed to the Prosecutor's Office of the Azerbaijani Republic and to the Supreme Court of the USSR with a request for the release of Oganesyan. If it is decided in Azerbaijan to see the investigation to its conclusion, let the trial be held somewhere on a neutral territory. The Supreme Court of the USSR has the right to make such a decision. The law stipulates this for emergency situations.

Meanwhile, on July 11, an official representative of Azerbaijan in Moscow announced Oganesyan was free – the second fictitious announcement. To this day Oganesyan has not been seen in Yerevan, in Moscow, or anywhere else.

New Times supports the Fund for the Protection of Glasnost in its demand. Vardan Oganesyan must be released. ■

There is a limit to patience

Lev Bezymensky

The nation should know its heroes, their favourite proverbs, sayings and parables. Vladimir Ivashko, Deputy General Secretary of the CPSU – the Party's No. 2 man – has made a worthy contribution to this "folklore." Asked whether the CPSU is in danger of a split, he related to the interviewer the following parable: "A certain collective farm chairman, who had come under unending fierce attacks from his enemies, said: 'they're punching me hard, but I'll hold out for as long as my jaw lasts me.'"

This collective farm chairman probably has a lasting jaw and seems to be standing firm to this day in the face of all that opposition, as does the whole of our indestructible collective- and state-farm system of agriculture. Our people are extremely patient, and so are millions of Communist Party members who have put up for years with a situation in which their leaders committed misdeeds and even downright crimes on the Party's behalf. I am not speaking of Stalin's time here, the verdict on Stalinism was long ago pronounced. I mean the present day for which all of us bear full responsibility.

> You can't be in several parties at once

Let's admit it: we used to get many slaps in the face. I mean each of us and all of us taken together. And Party members took a much tougher beating than the rest of us. Just let us pause and think: how come at the elections in the Russian Federation the communist Party found itself in opposition to the very people it had always been at one with?

Complaints about those vicious democrats undermining the CPSU's prestige won't help here. Neither will the meaningful hints about the scheming CIA, planting its agents-provocateurs inside the Party, or pseudo-discussions of the kind found in the Discussion Columns of our central Party paper, which mistakes twenty or even a hundred varieties of one and the same opinion for a variety of opinions. Like an ancient hero who could be killed with his own sword only, the Party inflicts blows on itself through the medium of its top bureaucrats who couldn't care less.

Since 1985, the Party has regarded itself as the initiator of reforms, taking credit for the historic breakthrough accomplished by Gorbachev and his then comrades-in-arms Yakovlev and Shevardnadze. In the meantime, there has started an intensive process of excommunicating from the Party leadership exactly those who demanded radical reforms. I am under the impression that the Party, which has rejected Yeltsin, has yet to understand what the "Yeltsin phenomenon" is all about. The memories of that hurt, especially to the fanfare in the Kremlin Palace of Congresses, but there is no getting away from them.

The second phase of the Party leadership's – not the Party's, but its leadership's, mind you – changeover to the "boomerang policy" was marked by the circumstances – ridiculous at first and more prosaic later – under which the Russian Communist Party (a party within a party) was born. Actually, this is not a party within a party, but a Party apparatus within a Party apparatus. It was not by chance that rank and file Party members have never been given a chance to make sure which party – Gorbachev's or Polozkov's – they are affiliated with. They have probably guessed the right answer. Be that as it may, an organizational and ideological centre of self-resistance has been set up in the CPSU. The centre is functioning non-stop. Having started with unseemly attacks on Alexander Yakovlev, it then found Yeltsin a hard nut to crack and subsequently mounted a frontal charge against Gorbachev, who is President and General Secretary rolled in one.

What's the big idea? Several phrases Mikhail Gorbachev uttered in his recent talk with Felipe Gonzalez provide the key to the answer. He spoke about political dangers, about the tenacious legacy of post-Stalinism, and about neo-Stalinism as a present-day reality. These phenomena are dangerous, indeed, even though not identical. As I see it, post-Stalinism is the "good old" all too familiar command-administrative system in the economy and politics, only minus repressions and downright violence. This "improved modification" of Stalinist dictatorship did not emerge yesterday, and it suited many. First and foremost, it suited the Party's thick upper crust, which thanks to it kept its role, especially in the periphery.

The fact that even the President (who is also General Secretary), having the reputation of being chary of words, speaks today of "the tenacious legacy of post-Stalinist times" ought to put one on the alert. It goes to show that the forces of resistance within the bureaucratic upper crust are extremely strong. Don't we feel this resistance literally from day to day? This resistance is even more strongly manifest "in deep Russia," where traditional District and Region Party committees have not only survived, but cleverly geared the District and Region Soviets to their needs.

Neo-Stalinism is the second danger to democracy, and a long underrated danger at that. Some regarded Nina Andreyeva's article as a manifestation of wounded pride, and Stalin portraits on truck windshields as defiance. Unfortunately, the situation is much more serious than all that. All things considered, neo-Stalinism has tuned into certain emotional attitudes, particularly those widespread among people of the wartime generation, which are very easily exploited. Especially so against the background of abortive reforms, spiralling inflation and the government's miscalculations, all of which can be used to place the reformers at a disadvantage. "Stalin kept the country in order,"

"Stalin reduced prices" – these simple arguments hold a strong appeal for many.

Frankly, in the "pre-June days," I was among those who feared lest such a combination of primitive electioneering and cynical politicking should work. Well, it hasn't. But won't it now work against the Party itself? This question is now assuming topical importance in view of the fact that the coming full session of the CPSU Central Committee is to come up with a draft of a new Party programme. To be quite honest, I do not expect much from another programme document. I know better than that. What really matters is something else: the time has come for every CPSU member to ascertain which party he is in.

Dear fellow Communists, are you in the ruling party or in the opposition? Judging by the situation in Russia (let alone the Baltics), you are in the opposition. In a democratic society, any party can be now in power, now in the opposition. The CPSU, however, has done the impossible: it contrives to simultaneously support and reject reforms.

> The CPSU must give a definite answer to the challenge of the times

This abnormal combination threatens to repeat itself at the national level. What will happen if the great programme for drawing our country into the progress of world civilization (which presuposes the recognition of all forms of property ownership) begins to materialize? What will happen if the USSR is organically included into the world economic ties according to the rules accepted in the world economy? If we overcome the fatal ideological barrier and start building up at long last, not another "ism" but a normal civil society? What will the Communist Party say to that – yes or no? Or will it once again put up a smokescreen of generalities, such as "socialist choice," which can mean anything at all, including the restoration of the old system? The developments in the Party following the 28th Congress showed that its well-intentioned resolutions actually gave free rein to the conservative forces. Even summons to the Central Control Commission failed to compel the conservatives to budge an inch.

The coming full session of the CPSU Central Committee will probably give both post-Stalinists and neo-Stalinists a chance to speak up for all the nation to hear. However, if the Party puts up with them, it will lose the last vestiges of popular trust in it. The situation in the country is changing. The emergence of the Movement for Democratic Reforms offers a definite enough alternative to many Communists who stay in the CPSU only by force of long-entrenched habit.

I think that in any case, the future programme should above all renounce the principle of the CPSU being a state party. Annulling Article 6 of the Constitution is not enough, the Party must realize that it can no longer claim the role it used to play. It can well be a ruling party if it comes to power by the will of the nation. Under no circumstances should it be the state party, however, because a state party bears in it the seed of dictatorship which compels Eduard Shevardnadze to end every speech, like a new Cato, by alerting his audience to the danger of a dictatorship. This danger is not conjecture, but very much a reality.

I know that many consider the CPSU incapable of staving off the danger of dictatorship, and believe that the latter is inherent in the very nature of the CPSU. In any case, it should not be deprived of a chance. The Party can use this chance if the coming programme rules out in no uncertain terms the possibility of men like Professor Sergeyev or General Makashov usurping the right to speak for the Party. This is not to say that the Party Programme or Rules should provide (to paraphrase the general's extraordinary suggestion) for the public floggings of Stalinists in Red Square. However, by renouncing the status of the state party, the CPSU will eliminate many potential dangers. It will remove the threat of **its own** dictatorship rather than that of other parties. But it is up to society as a whole to create, slowly but surely, its new multi-party ethics.

Incidentally, I have already come up with many fantastic schemes on the pages of this magazine, so let me submit to you another one. No party other than the CPSU can share its experience with other parties which have just emerged on the Soviet political scene. Apart from experience, it may also share its funds by contributing them towards a real, not sham, multi-party system. Why not set up a "democratization foundation" of sorts to which the CPSU and other public organizations and sponsors could give their money (of which they have a lot), their buildings (now standing half-empty), and so on. Not under pressure, but of their own free will...

As I was daydreaming like that, the booming voice of a TV announcer brought me back to reality: he was reading a TASS(!) report on a statement made by the CPSU Central Control Commission, which had censured the "renegade" Eduard Shevardnadze for "knocking together a party opposed to the CPSU." My God, all those familiar labels again! Shortly before that we had heard the President describe the new movement in a much more tolerant and constructive way. Even if this is the opposition, why automatically dismiss it as something bad?

In the meantime the CPSU is not in a hurry to answer the challenge of the times. There may be nothing wrong with consolidation, but so far the campaign for it has only revived conservative ideas and tendencies. Therefore it does not pay to tax any longer the patience of millions of upright people who are now ashamed of their party. The die must be cast.

There is a limit to any patience.

Chernobyl: who lives off the sarcophagus?



Grigory Nadyarnykh,
director of the Engineering Centre of Applied Ecology

Sergei Shilin,
chief expert of the Centre

The five years after the meltdown have been wasted. The contaminated zone is a breeding ground for incompetence, confusion and misappropriations...

Paradoxically, the five years since the Chernobyl meltdown have not yet yielded any scientist or a school of thought capable of carrying out a comprehensive analysis of the entire complex of scientific, technical, socio-psychological and legal aspects of an industrial catastrophe of the magnitude of Chernobyl, an analysis that could be trusted abroad, more importantly, at home.

People have long since lost all faith in official information, and bureaucrats' appearances on TV and in the press act counterproductively for the nuclear power generation which, at least at the present time, does not seem to have any alternative.

The first Soviet nuclear power plant was commissioned in 1954 in the town of Obninsk, and the first large-scale nuclear disaster occurred just three years later, in 1957, when a receptacle of liquid radioactive waste exploded at the Mayak nuclear complex in the Ural town of Kyshtym. The documents and materials pertaining to the Kyshtym disaster were classified as secret for thirty years after the actual event.

There were a number of fires in the reactor and equipment of the Beloyarsk nuclear power plant. However, in thirty-odd years – until the Chernoby meltdown – no one cared to at least develop adequate fire fighting systems. If a nuclear disaster happens again tomorrow, putting out the fire will once again be the deadly mission of poorly-equipped fire fighters.

We took part directly in the Chernobyl cleanup. Like thousands of our colleagues, who are known as "liquidators" in this country, we cannot be indifferent to what attitude to Chernobyl and to the possibility of a similar disaster happening may take shape in society. An ad hoc parliamentary commission is investigating the causes of the disaster and the activities of officials involved in it. One can only hope that the commission's investigation will not end by punishing a few minor figures as has repeatedly been the case before. The imperative today is to form a new social policy of the state aimed at removing the tragic consequences of the Chernobyl disaster and preparing society for industrial disasters that may happen in the future.

Experts at work

One of the most large-scale actions taken in the early days and weeks after the actual meltdown was the effort to stop the deadly emission of radioactive products from the destroyed reactor.

to prevent a chain reaction, to stop the burning of graphite, to cool the active zone, and to reduce the discharge of radioactive products onto the surface.

Initially, the cleanup teams tried to cool the active zone by pumping water onto it, which was senseless, taking into account the magnitude of destruction. As a result, the water flooded the room under the reactor, became radioactive and had to be pumped out later. The decision was made to try to cool the reactor with dry substances.

To prevent a chain reaction, the reactor was filled with boracic acid, which is widely used at nuclear power plants as a material absorbing neutrons. However, no one took into account the fact that the temperature in the destroyed part of the plant was over 700 degrees Centigrade. At this temperature, boracic acid disintegrates, and the resulting products evaporate.

As for the burning graphite, it must have been regarded as the main reason for the rise in temperature and the chief source of the formation of radioactive sprays. No one remembered that even after the chain reaction has stopped, nuclear fuel continues to warm up for some time. As a source of heat and radiation, the graphite burning in the reactor was tens of times as small as the nuclear fuel itself.

Lead was dropped into the reactor to cool it. It was believed that lead would cause the temperature to go down. According to the former Deputy Minister of Power Industry and Electrification of the USSR, Gennady Shasharin, the use of lead was recommended by the Deputy Chairman of the State Nuclear Inspection, Corresponding Member of the USSR Academy of Sciences, Victor Sidorenko, in order "to reduce the radiation." The decision to start dropping lead was made despite Shasharin's insistence that the main danger was not the gamma radiation from the destroyed reactor, but the discharge of radioactive vapours and sprays.

The boiling point of lead

The circumstances under which this decision was made and the level of competence of the people who made it are described in the testimony of Yevgeny Ignatenko, the former deputy head of Soyuzatomenergo: "I had only one reservation: the temperature of the boiling point of lead. For some reason I thought it was around 900 degrees. This meant that the lead would boil and radioactivity would be discharged together with the lead vapours. I tried to check this at the chemical laboratory of the plant, but there was no reference book. Finally, I called up my wife in Moscow. She asked me to call back again in half an hour, and when I did so, she told me the boiling point of lead was 1,700 degrees. This suited us perfectly."

Why was the boiling point of lead the only thing that worried Ignatenko? Why didn't other participants in the discussion consider the fact that at a temperature close to 1,000 degrees lead can only exist in a liquid state and can evaporate without any boiling? Evidently, the whole amount of lead dropped into the reactor – about 2,400 tons – evaporated very quickly, carrying radioactivity into the atmosphere.

After the reactor was buried under sand and other dry substances, the normal flow of air into the crater was disturbed, and the natural cooling stopped. As a result of the ensuing "dry boiling effect, radioactive discharge intensified on May 3 to 5, and the temperature in the crater soared to 3,000 degrees. In its turn, the increase in temperature resulted in the enrichment of the discharge with non-volatile radioactive isotopes, plutonium in particular. The burying of the reactor resulted in even greater radioactive contamination of the area and exposure of army units involved in the cleanup to overdoses of radiation.

No less debatable is the decision to rush ahead with efforts to prevent radioactivity from spreading with underground and surface currents of water. A whole complex of protective measures was carried out, including the strengthening of the banks of the River Pripyat, building of 131 protective and filtering dams, drainage curtains, a ground 0.6-metre thick wall of watertight materials constructed at the depth of 30-35 metres and fencing off an area of about 350,000 square metres. The analysis of the rates of migration of radioactive substances in the environment, and the fact that the meltdown occurred after the spring high flood, could have suggested that the water-protecting measures could have easily waited for at least several months. Had these measures been carried out at the end of summer, workers involved in the construction would have been exposed to much lesser radiation.

Another violation of common sense was the effort to decontaminate the plant itself and adjacent areas already in May in the conditions of a continuing fallout. It took the whole summer for the Government Commission to issue its September decision, ordering that all decontamination efforts be stopped except for those directly connected with the construction of the sarcophagus.

Naturally, one cannot fail to mention the very first decision made after the disaster. According to the former director of the Chernobyl nuclear power plant, Victor Bryukhanov, on the day after the meltdown he received an instruction from the minister of power industry to work out the *schedule of reconstruction of the damaged power-generating unit.* When Politburo members Nikolai Ryzhkov and Yegor Ligachev arrived at the site of the disaster, they were told that according to the schedule, the reactor would be back in operation by au-

The All-Union voluntary self-governing public movement Association Chernobyl is addressing you. We would like to draw the attention of Soviet and foreign readers to the problems of two people who had taken part in the Chernoby cleanup effort

Davletshin Minnigali, took part in the cleanup in August-October 1987. According to the official version, he was exposed to 6.575 R. In fact, however, his condition is much more serious. Davletshin, who worked with a dosimetric control team, once activated his radiation counter in the area where liquidators assembled after work and found a radiation source of 270 R. He believes that prolonged contact with that source is the reason for his illness. He became sick a year later, in 1988, and his right leg was amputated in January 1989. His condition continues to worsen. His joints hurt. The artificial leg manufactured in Kazan is inconvenient, because it weighs over five kilograms and because the operation was carried out with no regard to the fact that the patient would be using an artificial limb. The artificial limb presses against the flesh, causing hemorrhage and pain. He needs a light-weight and convenient artificial limb, which is not produced in this country. Davletshin needs medical help and effective treatment. His other leg is weakening, too. Now he has to stay at home most of the time – he has no wheelchair in which to move about.

Gashakber Shigabiyev of the village of Kukmor, Tataria, who fell ill after work on the roof of the damaged reactor, needs similar help. His legs were amputated. He needs a wheelchair and artificial limbs.

We are fully aware of the fact that cries for help are today coming from all over the country, and kind souls in the USSR and the West cannot help everybody. We are placing our hopes on Divine Providence and sheer luck. Our address: 36-7, Kommunisticheskaya Ul., Yelabuga TSSR, 423630. Bank account No. 000608102 Yelabuga branch APB MFO 265243.

P. Abdulgafarov,
deputy chairman of the Yelabuga branch of Association Chernobyl

The first dam on the Pripyat: it was believed that bags of sand would prevent the radioactive contamination of the soil by river water

A year after the catastrophe: the Ministry of Public Health of the USSR sanctioned sowing on the border of the 30-kilometre zone. The press was elated, so was *New Times*

tumn or winter. "I thought I would die of shame," Bryukhanov confided. What reconstruction could be discussed when the reactor was totally destroyed? Why was the decision to reconstruct the reactor made immediately after the disaster and the decision to evacuate the population of the exposed areas only two days later?

The discussion in earnest of such plans on the government level in the context of an extraordinary situation shows the utter incompetence, if not the amorality of the decision makers.

A reserve for ministries

Until April 1986, the peculiar feature of the Soviet nuclear complex was that the designing of nuclear power generating reactors, processing and enrichment of nuclear fuel, and burying of nuclear waste was the responsibility of the Ministry of Medium Machine Building, while the everyday running of the nuclear power plants was the domain of the Ministry of Power Industry and Electrification of the USSR. Moreover, these two ministries were subordinate to different structures within the Council of Ministries of the USSR. The State Committee of the USSR for Hydrometeorology and Environmental Control, responsible for radiation monitoring, and the State Nuclear Inspection of the USSR, responsible for nuclear safety, also acted parallelly.

The problems of radiation medicine, radiation effects on biological objects, and anti-radiation protection were the sphere of specialized institutes within the Ministry of Public Health of the USSR. Thus, the problems pertaining to the functioning and development of the nuclear power-generating industry could be considered comprehensively only on the level of the USSR Council of Ministers. As for the Council of Ministers, it assumed responsibility for the ministries' decisions, rather than controlling those ministries. This pattern of work, naturally, generated an atmosphere of collective irresponsibility.

After the Chernobyl disaster in April 1986, the Ministry of Nuclear Power Industry was formed. The new ministry could hardly radically upgrade the management of nuclear power plants, at least because this would require a total revision of the entire concept of nuclear power generation and creation of a qualitatively new management system could only be considered afterwards. It, probably, would have been better to re-assign all the nuclear power plants under the authority of the Ministry of Medium Machine-Building, which constructed the plants and, compared with other ministries and departments, was marked for greater discipline and a significant scientific and technological potential. However, a new ministry was established, responsible for monitoring the spending of money allocated by the state on the cleanup effort, which had already become a separate paragraph in the national budget. After the sarcophagus was built in 1986, prodigeous material resources and funds were allocated for scientific research, reconstruction and running of the Chernobyl plant, decontamination of the nearby areas and villages and the construction of the town of Slavutich, situated 60 kilometres from the plant and intended to serve as the settlement for the plant's personnel instead of the heavily-contaminated town of Pripyat.

In 1986, the Industrial Association Kombinat was set up in the framework of the new ministry. The Chernobyl nuclear power plant became a part of the association. In fact, Kombinat soon became the absolute master of the exposed 30-kilometre zone around the plant and started to control all the funds the government allocated for the cleanup.

At the same time, the Government Commission based in Chernobyl continued to sanction large-scale and costly technological solutions and projects. Quite often these projects were generated not by necessity, but by the contractors' desire to grab a fatter share of the government allocations. If someone rightly suspected that the number of people and organizations, the money allocated to them, or various technological projects were not commensurate with the objectives of the cleanup programme, and turned to Kombinat for explanations, he was shown the instruction of the Ministry of Nuclear Power Industry. In its turn, the Ministry referred to the orders of the Fuel and Energy Complex Bureau under the USSR Council of Ministers. At the same time, defending the significance and expediency of its efforts, Kombinat referred to the relevant decision of the Government Commission. The Commission's decisions were based on the opinions of experts who were mostly representatives of organizations interested in continuing the financially profitable contract relations with Kombinat.

"The provider"

What is the thirty-kilometre zone of evacuation to which many a lyrical report continue to be devoted even now?

The conditions of work in the zone were defined as "extremely hazardous," which meant a special system of payment. All salaries and wages were doubled and beefed up with monthly 50-percent bonuses, some other forms of payments, three free meals a day, free uniform and hostel, and the prospect of early retirement. Each fifteen day period of working in the zone was followed by a fifteen-day vacation. Naturally, many of those who came to work in the zone deemed it their professional and moral obligation. However, most leading positions were occupied by bureaucrats, who had not been very happy about their career prospects in other jobs, scientists who wanted to cash in professionally on the Chernobyl tragedy, and mediocres whose ambitions greatly exceeded their professional capabilities. Many such people were thinking about more profitable terms of the upcoming retirement – at the time when army units were carrying out the most difficult and dangerous cleanup missions.

The word "provider" that soon came to

A session of the industrial committee Kombinat – the virtual master of the Chernobyl zone

Former director of the Chernobyl plant, Bryukhanov, was sentenced to ten years in prison: he is the only person to admit he felt ashamed...

define the sarcophagus can help illustrate the ideology of cynicism widespread in the zone. The regime of the closed zone inaccessible for public control could not but encourage the feeling of impunity. The lists of information that might not be disclosed were at times absurdly long. Any report concerning the Chernobyl problems was severely censored.

"Blacks" and "whites"

Depending on the kind of activity and position, people had different opportunities in the zone.

First. After the population had been evacuated, a lot of property formerly belonging to the people was left behind. People were paid compensations, and the property, including cars, small river craft, furniture, consumer electronics, etc., became no one's. Besides, there were the reserves of the retail network and the property which used to belong to various enterprises and organizations. Part of the property was used directly in the zone, the rest was buried as radioactive waste. Who can now check how many cars were really buried and how many safely escaped?

Second. The zone was getting much from the country. In the context of chronic shortages of food and construction materials, material supplies on the basis of personal connections, absurdly complicated system of accounting for material valuables, and unending personnel reshuffling, the opportunities for misappropriation in the zone were indeed great.

Third. Special canteens for bosses appeared in the zone, as well as service black and white Volga cars with privileged licence plates, hooters and flashlights. Bureaucrats were fighting for cushy jobs, and as a result, the organizations they represented started to conflict as well.

The use of army units was perfectly justified in the early weeks after the disaster. The army carried out the crucial missions, such as radiation and engineer reconnaissance, the setting up of field decontamination posts, decontamination of transport routes, and air transport operations.

Later, the army units manned with called-up reservists turned into a mass of unskilled workers, carrying out a tremendous but mostly senseless mission of decontaminating everything in sight.

Soldiers – workers, drivers and builders only yesterday called up under the pretext of regular military training – served for up to six months in the zone until they had been exposed to the critical individual dose of 25 rems. It goes without saying that the dosimetric control, living and transportation conditions and provision with uniforms and food were much worse for army units than for the civilian personnel.

The deepening of contradictions between the "blacks" and the "whites," the reluctance to carry out senseless and tiresome work, the lack of any attention and concern on the part of the state bureaucracy to the fate and health of hundreds of thousands of people who had undergone "military training" in the exposed zone, resulted in the emergence of public organizations like Association Chernobyl, which started asking the state "tricky" questions.

In addition, the secret information leaking from under the barbed wire fences of the zone cast a dark shadow on the official heroic legend and aroused mixed feelings in miners, soldiers and builders who dug tunnels under the reactor, cleaned up graphite and nuclear fuel, from the roof of the third reactor, drove cement mixers, piloted helicopters, constructed the sarcophagus in the spring–summer of 1986...

A macabre feast

What is happening in the zone now reminds one of a macabre feast. The threat of losing their privileges and cushy jobs makes whole work collectives and their leaders go to enormous lengths to keep the perks. As a result, some organizations get rechristened, new profitable jobs are invented, and functions redistributed.

The Ministry of Nuclear Power Industry, set up after April 1986, has been dissolved. Its former functions of running nuclear power plants have been reassigned to the Ministry of Medium Machine-Building, which now goes by the name of the Ministry of Nuclear Power and the Nuclear Industry of the USSR. The industrial association Kombinat has been closed down to be replaced with the Scientific Industrial Association Pripyat... This confusion is characteristic of all five years that have elapsed since the meltdown.

Unlike other organizations working in the zone, the nuclear power plant itself is doing serious work – producing electricity. However, the decision of the Ukrainian government to shut the plant in 1995 is a hard blow to the personnel of the station and may turn the newly-built town of Slavutich into a centre of critical unemployment. The Ukrainian government decision will also render meaningless the cost of the Slavutich construction and many other large-scale projects... A logical result of the short-sighted and incompetent planning policies...

What will happen next?

The recently enacted law of the Ukraine On the Legal Regime of the Territory Exposed to Radioactive Contamination as a Result of the Chernobyl Disaster stipulates the setting up of the Administration of the Zone, a special body in the system of the State Committee of the Ukraine for Protection of Citizens from the Consequences of the Chernobyl Disaster. However, the "new" administration may be composed of old figures, and fresh hundreds of millions of rubles will go down the drain.

The American surgeon Robert Gale, who helped treat Chernobyl victims, said that the Chernobyl disaster was the ultimate symbol of all Soviet problems. We believe that the main problem is the moral decay of society.

EXCLUSIVE FOR NT

Seven friends better than a hundred rubles

New Times interviewed **Strobe TALBOTT,** a prominent American sovietologist, the leading *Time* analyst, and the translator of N. Khrushchev's memoirs, on the eve of the London summit of the seven leading industrial countries and the forthcoming visit of the Soviet leader to London

New Times. How do you in the United States estimate the Soviet Union, your former political rival and your present partner?

Strobe Talbott. To tell the truth, so far it is rather difficult to grow accustomed to the number of your presidents which has recently sharply grown up. This, of course, reflects the new plurality of your country in both its international policy and Soviet-American relations.

NT. By "plurality" you evidently mean a political pluralism, diversity of opinions?

S.T. No, I mean the crisis of the Union. I hope I do not offend you by using this word. For more than forty years, i.e., the whole period of the cold war, the USA has had to do with a strong, gigantic political union called the USSR. Recently, the Americans have suddenly discovered that it is no longer a union, but a number of constituents with their own ambitions, Russia being the largest of them. For us Americans and for our White House it is not so easy to understand what is really going on in the Soviet Union, which all of a sudden became pluralistic, and to work out the right attitude towards it.

NT. So to which side does the balance weigh in Washington and in its European allies?

S.T. At present there is a lot of dispute and no common position. Now the "seven" are planning to meet with President Gorbachev in London. Quite recently, not to mention 5 or 10 years ago, it was clear to everyone what possibilities and powers the leader of your country possessed. Now everything has turned out much more complicated, because your country is living through a period of crisis of its whole political machinery – of its political system, of its economy which is in a state of transition from socialism to the free market. And we ask ourselves: what is this, after all? Is it one country or a number of countries?

NT. You ask yourselves questions, but do you find answers to them?

S.T. Personally, I am a traditionalist, even in a sense a conservative. And I have always believed that the Soviet Union will remain a gigantic country with Moscow as its capital, even if some republics manage to obtain independence. It will comprise the Slavonic republics, Kazakhstan and the Central Asian republics which have nowhere to go anyway. But I must say frankly that I have become sceptical of the opinion shared by many of my Soviet friends that all this has already happened. This scepticism was fuelled by my recent visit to the Ukraine with professor M. Mandelbaum of Johns Hopkins University. We were astonished by the unity of passion with which the Ukrainians strive for what I call functional independence. What you call sovereignty does not reveal the essence. Because it is not so much a matter of secession as of the desire of these people to break with the political and economic system of socialism as a whole. We had expected to come across such tendencies in the Baltics, but not in the Ukraine. Incidentally, I have found that our impressions of what is happening in this republic radically differ from the Muscovites' ideas on this matter. It's one of the two: either we have spoken with the wrong persons or the situation is developing quicker than they can become aware of it in Moscow. And if the Ukraine achieves its end, then what does the future have in store for the Soviet Union, what will become of this country? At present I am constantly preoccupied with this problem.

NT. Your ideas seem to differ from those entertained by some of your friends.

S.T. If they had gone to Kiev as we did, and if they had seen and heard what we did, they would have had some doubts as to whether the 52-million-strong Ukrainian population considers Moscow the capital of their state. And it is important to note that this is not at all nationalism, as is customarily believed, although the desire to break away from Moscow has merged with nationalism in the Ukraine. As a person who has long studied your country, who deeply respects its people and wishes them only the best, I have formed a conviction that the Union is falling to pieces, and this occurs exactly because the whole social system has outlived itself.

Here is another example, a more demonstrative one, so to speak. I happened to visit Vladivostok in September of the last year. It is known as a closed city, but the door does sometimes open slightly. It's a wonderful city, it just charmed me. It has a more or less homogenous Slavonic population and, naturally, there cannot be the question of nationalism there. Yet I had a feeling that the people there also want, if not to break away from Moscow, then at least not to be under it, to free themselves from its guardianship. You simplify the problem by reducing such tendencies to ethnic and interethnic questions, which of course, are sufficiently complicated and difficult to solve. If the USSR wants to survive under this or some other name, it will

have to change its economic and political system, otherwise a complete disintegration will occur in the country.

NT. What, in this situation, may be the so-much-talked-of and debated Western help?

S.T. Let us touch upon a couple of aspects of this important problem. Since there is no fundamental programme of economic reforms, whatever money we might give or invest will be in vain because it will simply be drowned in the quagmire of the Soviet economy and will be of no use to anyone except maybe to a few of those who manage to filch something for their own pocket.

NT. But there may be other forms of aid too...

S.T. Sure. I consider the aid by expertise, training of specialists and education as such a useful and comparatively easy form. While in the Ukraine we spent one day at a *Rukh*-organized conference devoted to the problem of the transition to a market economy. Some American experts took part in its work. They noted the intellect, sincerity and interestedness of Ukrainian participants, but at the same time they were perplexed by their ignorance. Persons decorated with numerous titles and degrees in economics had not the slightest idea of the most elementary matters. For instance, a titled Soviet expert held it that the Japanese yen did not belong to the category of hard currency because one dollar exchanges for quite a heap of yens – about one hundred and fifty. To the best of my knowledge, a similar level of understanding of economic problems is also displayed by some Soviet leaders. How much they still should learn about the international economy! I think therefore that an education in economics is, inter alia, that same indispensible aid that may and must be rendered to the Soviet Union by the West. On an elementary, basic level it should be manuals, translated into the Russian and other languages, including school textbooks, even comic strips with explanation of basic notions.

NT. But are there also possibilities of developing trade and investments?

S.T. There should be more favourable conditions created to this end. So far you have been not very hospitable. As long as your collective mind – the Soviets of all levels – is hostile towards private property, it is simply unwise to invest large amounts of capital in your economy.

I love this country very much, I dream of buying an apartment in Moscow in order to have in my possession some, albeit symbolic, part of your country to which I have devoted the greater part of my life, trying to understand it. But even Soviet people are deprived of the right to possess a fraction of their own country. Therefore the problem of private property is a very important question. Is it surprising that Western businessmen do not want to run the risk of investing their capital in the Soviet economy as long as the conditions are dictated by the avowed advocates of the communist perspective, by marxists who believe that private property spells death?

NT. The West often ties up the question of credits and investments with political conditions, which displeases some of our countrymen...

S.T. But there is not such a thing as purely economic aid. It is always linked to politics, it symbolizes, as it were, political relations...



Drawing by Victor Bogorad

The West is now attempting to work out a package of measures which might help implement your reforms. But here, if the credits are offered without prior conditions, they, as has already happened more than once, will go no one knows where, in all probability they may enrich only your Ministry of Defence, which we in no way intend to support. Least of all does the West desire to lubricate the Soviet military machine with its own finances. The Soviet Union is an excessively militarized country. Frankly speaking, I belong to those who believe that the danger of Soviet aggression has always been exaggerated. The greatest losses were inflicted by this machine on its own country, its own people. Therefore, whatever aid the West decides to extend to the Soviet Union, Western leaders must be sure that they do not strengthen the military in the USSR, that the process of clearing up the relations between the republics will take a peaceful form. It is in our interests that our humble influence is constructive. These are our political conditions.

NT. And what is the position of the US Administration in relation to providing economic aid to the USSR?

S.T. When George Bush became President in 1989, his attitude towards the USSR was that of great suspicion, but it began to fade out very quickly. He feared criticism from the conservatives, but soon understood that criticism from the centre and the liberal circles was much more dangerous. There were also other factors that brought about the change in his attitude – from opposition to Moscow to readiness to coperate – these are: the pressure of public opinion, both American and West European; the pressure exerted by Congress and the State Secretary; opinions of communist reformers in Poland and Hungary expressed to him during his visit in 1989 and, finally, the establishing of personal relations with Gorbachev. Bush's ideas about the events in your country are largely derived from his communication with your president. Two more factors have recently influenced his ideas, negatively – the bloodshed in the Baltics, and positively – the rapidity of decentralization and democratization in the USSR.

Today Bush wants to render Gorbachev mainly symbolic assistance, he wants to demonstrate to him and to his colleagues that he still enjoys the White House's support and retains its trust. Incidentally, this alone provokes disputes not only in your country, but in the United States as well. You may still find quite a few people in our country who retain a favourable impression of him. Perhaps because they don't have to live under the economic conditions you are living under. For many Americans he is still the Man of the Decade, as our magazine called him and as I consider him, because it was he who secured freedom for Eastern Europe. As for the Soviet people, he not only reduced the quantity of ministerial bureaucrats who had multiplied to absurd proportions, but, which is most important, he abolished the "ministry of terror" that had pervaded all facets of life of Soviet society, of every human being. This should never be forgotten, by accomplishing this alone he has deserved historical memory as well as the grateful memory of posterity.

Interviewed by
Gennady Ariyevich

No experience of vertigo

The project of erecting the world's highest building in Vladivostok, according to the developments of the Japanese firm Takenaka, with a powerful telecommunications complex atop (see *NT*, No.25, 1991) has provoked a lot of questions from our readers

At the request of our Tokyo correspondent, **Vladimir OVSYANNIKOV,** a Japanese city-building specialist, deals with some technical aspects of the project.

The concept of a vertical composite urban cummunity was introduced at a meeting of the Japanese Macro-engineering Society in 1987. This concept was to utilize air space in a megalopolis such as Tokyo. In 1988 Group V–1000 was formed to study a vertical composite urban community. The group is a joint effort between members from Research Laboratory of Takenaka Corporation and Shizuo Harada, an architect. The group announced the concept of Sky City 1000 in June of 1989.

The differences between this structure and conventional buildings are the following: shelf-type manmade lands will be constructed that contain all of the infrastructural facilities (transportation, energy and water supply, drainage, etc.) needed in an urban area. Residences, office buildings and stores will be built on each manmade land.

Sky City 1000 will be 1000 meters in height with a diameter of 400 meters at the bottom level. At the top level a diameter is 160 meters and the total floor space will be 800 hectares.

If 200 hectares are used for a residential area, then 10,000 160 sq.m. lots can be created. An other 200 hectares can provide office space for 100,000 people. The other spaces can be used for commercial stores, shops, transportation, parks, educational facilities, etc.

In the development of Sky City, many things were considered, such as the space structure, the structural type, the vertical transportation system, new materials, construction robots, the prevention of disasters and the conservation of energy.

One of the proposals is called "Space Plateau". Sky City will be a huge structure composed of fourteen concave plateaus piled one atop the other. A large plaza will be located at the center of each concave plateau. In these plazas, one can feel the wind and enjoy many different kinds of foliage. The plaza will be surrounded by an manmade shelf-type land. Therefore, people will not suffer from vertigo.

In Sky City rain water will be utilized as a component of the water supply. Electric power will be supplied through the use of fuel cells and through the incineration of waste matter. Furthermore, water-generated electric power will also be possible in Sky City.

Four different modes of transport will provide a transportation system that is highly reliable. "Triple-Decker", three-storied, high capacity, rapid, linear motor elevators will connect the fourteen space plateaus. "Spiral Monorails" which will ascend and descend on the exterior of the tower will serve as a mass transportation system, "Sky Cabs," for individual use, will be available for the safe transport of physically handicapped people and the aged.

At present, the construction cost for the 800 hectares Sky City is estimated to be 4,7 trillion yen (approximately US$35,4 billion).

The sharp rise of central city land prices is expected to continue indefinitely. In 1989 the most expensive land in Tokyo reached 50 million yen (US $400 thousand) per square meter.

And so it makes sense to build cities of the Sky City type. A research committee for the "development" of a space system for a super high rise city" was started as one of a series of projects for the research and development of the Engineering Advancement Association of Japan. The new committee consists of about 100 persons of many technical fields, from iron manufactures to psychologists. We believe the concept will be greatly improved. And we do hope to gather knowledge and wisdom from around the world.

Masato Ujigawa
(A member of Group–1000)

TOKYO

Traditional holiday is cancelled this year

Troops are moving towards the Austrian-Yugoslav border

The traditional summer holiday at the Karl-Renner-Institut, whose honorary host is Franz Vranitzky, has been cancelled this year because of developments in Yugoslavia. I learned this from an apologetic telephone call to the *New Times* Vienna office from the Federal Chancellor's department.

These days people receive many telephone calls about the cancellation of previous arrangements. The good-humoured and light-hearted Austrians are obviously in no mood for merry-making now. Right after the first armed clashes in the Socialist Federative Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY) the Austrian government took emergency measures.

Slovenes have seized these tanks from the YNA

Trains with troops, weapons, and equipment moved one after the other towards the southern border. Kürassier tanks have been advanced to operational positions. Draken fighters are patrolling the skies. Soldiers are digging trenches. Field engineers are building defences, planting mines, and mounting anti-tank hedgehogs.

True, some of the forces have been withdrawn into the heart of Austria again, as tensions in the neighbouring country somewhat lessen. Austrian Defence Ministry officers never forget, however, that the Balkans are the Balkans with their history. So, they do not think of bringing all the soldiers back to their barracks yet. Moreover, the armed conflict in the SFRY has helped the military receive allocations for the purchase of modern weapons systems. Of late the National Defence Council has sanctioned the purchase of surface-to-air and air-to-air missiles which the Austrian army did not have before. This will come to 1,300 million schillings for the taxpayers.

The Austrian military see their main task as preventing the armed conflict from spreading onto the territory of their country. Hence, Austria's demonstration of its presence in the borderland. By the way, until quite recently the Austrian-Yugoslav frontier practically was not guarded, open both ways, with peace and tranquillity reigning there.

Austrian diplomats have also been very active. It has been namely Austria which has used the conflict-prevention system evolved within the framework of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe. Austria also suggests other initiatives for a peaceful resolution to the crisis situation.

The Austrian government devotes great attention to the Balkan affairs for many reasons. Some of them are deeply rooted in the common historical past. Others are directly connected with the numerous political, economic, and cultural contacts of our day. The Austrian government has always tried to maintain contacts with as many political parties and groups in Yugoslavia as possible. No wonder, the Austrian public knows the faces of Yugoslav leaders Kucan, Peterle, Tudzman, and Mesić much better than the faces of some Austrian politicians.

The official recognition of Slovenia and Croatia is a topic of paramount importance now. Resolutions in support of this move keep coming from all sides.

Chancellor Vranitzky exerts quite an effort to control this pressure. He notes the importance of the concerted action of the entire international community, at that. In the opinion of Alois Mock, Austrian Foreign Minister, if Austria is the first to recognize Slovenia and Croatia it can confer dubious benefit upon them. The supporters of the former Yugoslav system, the Serbian leaders and army first of all, will thereby be offered a fresh occasion for attacking the republics which have been striving for independence.

The crisis in the SFRY has pushed all other internal and international affairs into the background. Control over any contacts with Yugoslavia has been increased. The Parliament has adopted a resolution prohibiting the export and transit of all types of weapons to Yugoslavia. As soon as the resolution had come into force the customs officials of the Schwechat Airport arrested the Zagreb-bound "urgent cargo" of several tons: sporting guns as well as grenade launchers.

Some alarming news of a fight going on in immediate proximity to the atomic power station in Krško, on the Slovenian-Croatian border, urged me to contact the headquarters of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in Vienna. I asked Hans Meyer, IAEA press officer, whether Yugoslavia were in a Chernobyl-like danger. In the opinion of Mr. Meyer, though, conventional weapons cannot damage the station. Its US-made reactor has realiable protection which cannot be broken even if a big airliner falls on it. Nevertheless, for the sake of security, the reactor was switched off after some YNA fighters with missile weapons flew at zero altitude over the atomic power station.

Anatoly Kovrigin,
our own correspondent

VIENNA

A treaty is worth the missiles

Negotiations on reducing strategic offensive weapons are drawing to a close. What will the coming Soviet-US Treaty be like? Which side has gained the upperhand in the exhausting debates?

These questions were put to **Regina KARP** of the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute by **Alexander Polyukhov** of *New Times*. The interview follows.

New Times. The US and Soviet presidents are preparing to sign a treaty on reducing strategic offensive weapons. Is this going to be a good treaty or a bad one? Will it actually reduce the sides' strategic arsenals by 50 percent?

Regina Karp. Unpublished so far, the document will come as a disappointment to many, I'm afraid. On the one hand, a ramified verification and control mechanism has been worked out. On the other hand, no halving of the arsenals will actually take place. At my estimate, the United States will have to scrap a total of 36 percent of its intercontinental missile warheads as against the Soviet Union's 50 percent. Let me stress that I am talking here only about the obligatory cuts which will constitute 41 and 49 percent for the US and Soviet ground-based missiles, and 34 and 53 percent for their submarine-borne missiles, respectively.

NT. Which means, in absolute figures...?

R.K. At my estimate, the USA will be able to keep 1,444 warheads (as against 2,450 now) on its intercontinental ballistic missiles and 3,456 (as against today's 5,216) on its submarine-borne missiles. The USSR is to cut the number of its ICBM warheads from 6,280 to 3,200, and the number of its submarine-borne missile warheads from 3,626 to 3,200. As a matter of fact, all the relevant information is classified, which makes it difficult to calculate real "ceilings." Unfortunately, even the exact number of strategic offensive weapons now possessed by the superpowers is unknown.

Thresholds and faults

NT. Strategic offensive weapons include bombers. What will happen to them?

R.K. The Treaty is based on the principles put forward by the US administration. They provide, in particular, for a serious reduction of heavy MIRVs which "undermine strategic stability." A milder approach is taken to submarine-borne missiles, let alone the bomber-borne nuclear weapons which are presumably unfit for striking the first disarming blow and, consequently, will be calculated more loosely. For instance, 150 US planes capable of carrying 20 nuclear cruise misssiles each will be counted as carrying 10 such missiles each, while 180 Soviet bombers carrying 16 cruise missiles each will be counted as carrying eight missiles each.

Because the United States has a large strategic air force (268 US planes as against Soviet 106), it will be allowed practically 4,580 nuclear warheads instead of the present 4,300, and the USSR, 2,260 instead of the present 974. In other words, the result will be contrary to intentions: each side will have the right to increase this component of offensive weapons.

NT. Will any restrictions be imposed on seaborne nuclear cruise missiles?

R.K. The USA has had them excluded from the range of weapons covered by the Treaty in exchange for the sides' "politically binding statement" to the effect that for the time being they will deploy no more than 880 such nuclear missiles with an effective range of over 600 km. Notably, this "ceiling" exceeds by far not only the number of such missiles possessed by the USA today (350), but even their planned production figure (758).

NT. If we haven't omitted anything, let us now sum up the numerical effect the Treaty is going to have on strategic forces. It looks as if the latter are going to exceed the limit agreed upon – 6,000 warheads per side, is that right?

R.K. The resultant sizes of strategic offensive forces will depend not only on the Treaty-imposed restrictions, but on the loopholes in the Treaty as well. There is no telling in advance if the USA or the USSR will use these loopholes in order to exceed "the proclaimed number of warheads," i.e., 6,000. I think the USA will get a chance to legally deploy 10,936 warheads (as against today's 12,316) and the USSR, 8,564 warheads (as against today's 10,880).

Strictly speaking, the USA will have to reduce its nuclear warheads by a mere 11 percent, and the USSR, by 21 percent.

NT. What are your forecasts based upon?

R.K. They rest on the statistics pertaining to the known US and USSR strategic programmes, on the record of the past strategic offensive arms reductions through discarding old systems, and the Treaty provisions I have access to. The financial, technical and political problems each side will come up against are unpredictable at present. For instance, the Pentagon will have a hard time securing Congress' consent to a mobile deployment of the MX-type ICBMs and to further purchases of the B-2 bombers, and for the Soviet military – overcoming the problems involved in building the TU-160 bombers and cruise missiles.

One of the faults of the Treaty is that it imposes restrictions not on real missile and plane types, but on classes and sub-classes of strategic offensive weapons, the composition of which may vary considerably. Modernization of strategic offensive weapons is not banned except in individual cases thoroughly agreed upon.

NT. What does this mean as applied to the USSR?

R.K. Large numbers of obsolete ground-based and submarine-borne ICBMs will be reduced, while modern nuclear weapons carriers will come to play a decisive role. Although the number of ground-based missiles will diminish, their accuracy will improve. Besides, these missiles will become less vulnerable since a third of them will be mobile. The arsenal of submarine-borne nuclear weapons will become more reliable – previously it suffered from an excessive variety of missile and submarine types. The proportion of the strategic air force will grow.

NT. What prospects are facing the USA in this respect?

R.K. The US will keep the right to carry on all the strategic offensive weapon modernization programmes: the deployment of the MX and Midgetman mobile missiles, of the B-2 (Stealth) bombers, etc. For Washington, the problem lies not in the Treaty-imposed restrictions (most of them suggested by the Americans), but in the fact that none of the above-mentioned programmes has sufficient support in Congress; therefore the future composition of the strategic triad remains vague.



Drawing by Sergei Khasabov

Washington seems to know where to proceed, but it is not sure it will get there.

Does the Joker always win?

NT. The Pentagon shouldn't complain – look at the problems our own Defence Ministry has to tackle.

R.K. Absolutely, but Washington has always maintained that the provisions of the Treaty will enhance strategic stability only if mobility of ground-based missiles is achieved. The USSR does have such missiles – SS-24 and SS-25, but the USA hasn't yet deployed its mobile weapons of this type. What if all the 1,000 American ground-based ICBMs remain in their silos, with 3,200 highly accurate warheads of Soviet ground-based missiles targeted on them? The "target-warhead" ratio (1–3.2 in the USSR's favour) will immediately alert those Senators for whom it has been the criterion of strategic stability or instability for 15 years now.

NT. Some in the USSR Supreme Soviet are also critical of the strategic offensive arms agreement. They certainly have arguments to support their criticisms.

R.K. Oh, yes. The Treaty is actually an American product: the ceilings and the rules have usually been suggested by Washington, and Moscow has accepted them. I have already mentioned the advantages the Treaty gives the USA in the percentage of the warheads reduced, in the calculation of the bomber missile load and in the number of cruise missiles, and the rejection by the Soviet Union of the demand that submarine-borne cruise missiles be included in the Treaty. The biggest fault of the Treaty is, however, that it does not link up strategic offensive arms with strategic defence. Moscow has failed to uphold the key point of its position. This does not bode well for the future.

NT. If the USA continues to develop its strategic defence system, then, judging by the mood in Moscow, the USSR may denounce the Treaty. Do you think that the notorious SDI is really as dangerous as all that?

R.K. It certainly is. The Soviet Union may abrogate the Treaty, but what will that amount to? The USA makes a move, and the USSR takes countermeasures. The USA answers them... The result will be an escalation of the nuclear missile race. Today there is a chance to avoid this dangerous stereotype, to take a different road...

NT. You mean, to realize the principle of "the fewer weapons, the less need for strategic defence"?

R.K. The SDI advocates may object that fewer offensive weapons means more chances for building up an efficient strategic defence. A sharp reduction of MIRVs obviates the need for the most sophisticated, the costliest and the most controversial element of anti-missile defence – a satellite-based ground missile suppression system. The experience of the Gulf War shows that monoblock ballistic missile warheads can well be combated by ground defence facilities. This means that a "cheap SDI" is a realistic proposition... I think strategic defence is a danger to strategic stability. There comes up a "Joker" in the shape of the anti-ballistic missile defence system – a vague part of the strategic offensive potential. There is no doubt that ABM missiles are effective not only against ICBMs, but against ground missiles and bombers as well. The first- and retaliatory-strike potential will be impaired.

NT. You have mentioned some of the Treaty's faults, and many more may come to light later. Is the document complicated enough to lend itself to different interpretations depending on political views?

R.K. Over ten years of work on the Treaty, its makers have overloaded it with technical parameters. Only a handful of experts can understand the whole of it. Therefore most people have to take it on trust. And this is extremely dangerous. I wonder why so few attempts are made, especially in the USSR, to explain the document – or its individual aspects, at least – to the public. Experts and the military keep mum so far. This creates a situation where it can become either a target of attacks by non-experts, or a pretext for attacks upon Soviet-US cooperation in general. The attacks may well be mounted under cover of discourses about the need for "improving the document," which actually cannot be "improved" – its draft completed three years ago, the document has been polished since then. Neither side will consent to its revision.

Accounts and balance-sheets

NT. Some of the Soviet critics of the Treaty will probably reason that since all attempts at cooperation with the USA fail, the Soviet Union had better reduce and modernize its strategic offensive arms unilaterally. Is this option acceptable? After all, it is not altogether devoid of logic.

R.K. Yes, the USSR could reduce its strategic arsenal at its own discretion, but scientists warn that one-sided arms reduction is dangerous to the world's "health." The US, with its enormous strategic offensive weapon arsenal, will not necessarily follow the USSR's example. For Washington, the outlook for strategic stability would become dim because some of Moscow's actions would be taken as a threat. The USA would be strongly tempted to keep its supremacy in strategic offensive arms forever. Such a situation would be fraught with unpredictable long-term consequences.

Bilateral, even if not 100 percent so, balanced arms reductions under a Treaty are vastly preferable.

NT. Is there any hope of France, Britain

and China joining in the process of strategic offensive arms limitations? Will the world system of nuclear arms non-proliferation become more effective?

R.K. One shouldn't overstate the readiness of other nuclear powers to reduce their arsenals. They say they will consider this only after the USA and the USSR have reduced their strategic offensive arms from thousands to hundreds of warheads. I do not take seriously President Mitterrand's recent initiative in this sphere. As to Britain, the new Treaty reserves for it the right to draw upon the United States' cooperation in nuclear arms buildup. China keeps silent, as usual. I am not so sure that the countries aspiring after the nuclear bomb – Israel, India, Pakistan, South Africa – will heed Soviet or American advice. They are developing, or have already created nuclear missiles of their own because, in their opinion, these weapons are essential for their security. True, when the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is revised in 1995, the experience of the superpowers may become a useful illustration of the axiom that it is difficult to make nuclear weapons, about as difficult to get rid of them, and practically impossible to use them.

NT. In what ways will the new stage of the negotiations differ from the work on the present Treaty?

R.K. Let's face it: all the previous treaties relevant to this sphere have had the purpose of optimizing the strategic arms race and leaving the sides' options open as regards the further modernization of strategic weapons. "Ceiling" limitations and weapons parameters were determined not by political considerations but military plans for using nuclear weapons in a potential war. It is necessary to put a resolute end to the dependence of arms reduction on military planning, to revise the functions of strategic forces in the new international situation which is now entirely different from what it used to be until a few years ago. For the USA and for the USSR alike, the key question now is whether the new political climate permits them to base their defence and their security on "moderate mutual deterrence" by means of reduced arsenals.

NT. What "ceilings" for strategic offensive arms are going to be discussed at the next round of talks? Or will Mikhail Gorbachev's dream of the world becoming nuclear-free by the year 2000 come true?

R.K. Most experts set the optimum "ceiling" at 3,000 warheads. I think, Gorbachev's dream will remain a dream. As a matter of fact, I don't think that the Soviet Union, which is sharply reducing its conventional weapons and armed forces, should give up nuclear weapons as the last deterrent.

STOCKHOLM

It takes a sense of the market

to prevent 500 days from stretching into 500 years

Dr. **Madsen PIRIE**, President of the Adam Smith Institute and a prominent British expert in matters of privatization, visited Lithuania and Estonia recently at the invitation from those republics' leaders. He has granted an interview to Sergei Babusenko, *New Times* correspondent in Britain, which follows

New Times. Dr. Pirie, as far as I know your conversations in the Baltics have centered on privatization problems, is that right?

Madsen Pirie. My hosts wanted to know what problems could arise in the course of privatization, in what ways they could draw on foreign experience, what the rates and the scale of this process should be.

NT. Did your hosts submit to you their plans for privatization of public property – or merely ask questions?

M.P. I had the impression that they did more listening than asking. I could feel that there was a political will for privatization in the republics. That, it seemed, was true of Estonia mostly, and somewhat less so of Lithuania.

"The whole trouble is that we do not have enough business managers," a high-placed Lithuanian official exclaimed during a discussion. There was a short pause. He repeated his exclamation more emphatically. It was some time before I realized that the statement was actually a question and that I was supposed to answer it. Having apologized for my poor knowledge of the local situation, I replied that even if Lithuania had not a single efficient business manager, which I doubted, there was no cause for worry: there would be more than enough of them within a year or two of launching the privatization process. Those would not be appointed from above, but selected by the market. In the early stages, the "captains" of privatized enterprises will emerge spontaneously. You do not need a Sorbonne diploma to run a store or a dressmaker's. All you need is a sense of the market. This is entrepreneurial spirit, not business management. You can't learn it, you've got to have it in you. Myself, I have no businessman in me, therefore I'm a mere scientist. Later, when the privatization of your big factories is in the order of the day you will need professional business managers, of course. But by that time, however, you will have non-professional entrepreneurs galore ready to manage larger industrial units. It is those people who'll have to take a course in business management.

NT. It is rather difficult to estimate the cost of the property the state offers for sale, isn't it?

M.P. Yes, so I felt... I told them that cost and its estimation were by no means the most important matters. However, privatization planners fail to see that the state really needn't charge the maximum price for its property... The important thing is that the company the property is sold to should produce goods which have a ready market. Whatever the initial selling price, a successful company will make a profit, pay taxes and create extra jobs. However, there is no ruling out the prospect of some private companies bringing in no profit, paying no taxes, and being forced to dismiss their workers while receiving state subsidies. Such companies represent the main danger.

In Britain there are cases of companies gaining in cost dramatically after being sold to a private owner. There is nothing terrible about it, on the contrary, this is a positive effect of privatization, which gives producers real incentive to try hard and meet consumers' demands. Without a profit, there will be no real development of production. Unless, of course, paper money emission is stepped up...

NT. Could you dwell in some detail on the problems connected with handing over state-run enterprises to private owners?

M.P. Everything should be done in the open, in public. From the political angle, it is important that you should not sell profitable and promising enterprises to your "friends". Already certain Western industrialists are obviously given special treat-

ment in your country... Let me emphasize the fact that it makes no difference how much the state will gain from the sale of property; its real value will be determined by the market itself, which will also answer the question of whether the given enterprise is needed at all. In Britain, attempts to sell property cheap to those who promised fabulous profits caused a series of sensational political scandals. In a free-market economy one can put his trust only in one thing – the market itself. Instead of seeking to make the most of the privatization deals, the state should seek to change the nature of the economy. I assure you that the profit made will be immediately reinvested so as to make more profit, to improve the quality goods and services, to make life better for those who use them.

NT. One of the aims pursued by privatization is to obtain the means to be invested in less efficient enterprise, isn't it?

M.P. Not quite. In a nutshell, the main objective is to restrict state investment in the economy. Although not the most elegant method, perhaps, this is the most effective one.

NT. Can you say that you have given your hosts a clear idea of what privatization is?

M.P. My conversations with prominent Estonian experts made it clear to me that in your country there is a long way to go from plans to their actual implementation... In answer to my question of whether I could buy a used bus here, they told me I could, in principle, but would have to do a lot of running about to secure the permission to do so. All right, I said, supposing I have gone all out and bought it. Will I be allowed to drive passengers in Tallinn, for instance? I would have to go through a great deal of red tape, but I might succeed in beating it, they told me. Well, my last question was, could I set my own bus fares? Privatization should pave the way to profit-making, otherwise it makes no sense. If I make a profit, invest it in another bus and make more profit as a result, then I am not a bad entrepreneur. People need my services, and this is the most important thing. Otherwise, I'll have to make way for a smarter man.

NT. You say that Estonia has taken a more correct approach to privatization...

M.P. In Lithuania, they have started with making privatization laws, which is not quite correct, to my mind. This will not expedite matters, in that republic privatization is regarded as a process to be guided from the centre. Actually, the central government is only to set the rate and directions of the process, i.e., to specify what is to be privatized and when.

Estonia's approach is different, a more pragmatic one, with the main emphasis on the social aspects of privatization. That hits the mark. You can't restructure the economy without carrying out social reforms first. In Estonia, they proceed from the premise that society ought to bear more responsibility for itself. On the other hand, Lithuania's authorities regard privatization as an element of the economic reform which, to my mind, is not quite correct because in this case the transition is accomplished at the expense of the public on the principle: suffer today so as to live better tomorow.

NT. Do you have any suggestions to make as to how privatization should be carried out in Russia, our largest republic?

M.P. Possibly, this process will take more time there than in the Baltics. The privatization of small businesses is one thing, and that of industrial giants is something else again. However, this is going to be an unprecedented and very profitable process. I think it calls for an early start but piecemeal action, with restaurants, hotels, and small stores to be the first to go private; the transport and distribution system to follow; and industry to come last. If you reverse this order, you will only land in chaos. In the early stages of privatization, decentralization is a must. This process alone can release the real creative and business potential of the public. Otherwise, your 500 days will stretch out into 500 weeks – years even.

While in the USSR, I often heard people complain that you are short of entrepreneurs. Oh, come off it, I told them, they are all over the place. It's simply that they have to concentrate on keeping out of jail: what they are doing would be common practice in a free-market economy, but is regarded as illegal or, at best, suspicious in your country.

NT. Western businessmen have been complaining of late that the laws which ban the sale of land to foreigners restrict Western business activity in our country.

M.P. I must warn you against the temptation of selling your land to foreigners. Selling a land plot to your own citizens or privatizing a piece of real estate is one thing, but selling land for foreign capital is a different matter. I am a patriot, although I own a tract of American land in Florida. Even that, however, did not stop me from addressing an American audience and alerting it to the negative consequences that might ensue from America selling even a quarter of its territory. Even for the most squeamish foreign businessman, a 50– or 99–year lease is a firm enough guarantee. In the City, you may find people who hold different views on that score, of course. But it is we, not they, who have thought up privatization which should serve the interests of the public instead of being the means of achieving abstract well-being for all. Anyway, the final decision rests with you...

LONDON

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Drawing by Leonid Vorobyov

That valiant but modest zulu warrior

Alexander PUMPYANSKY and Nikolai RESHETNYAK, *New Times* special correspondents, interviewed Dr. MANGOSUTHU BUTHELEZI, a South African Zulu leader, whom some people consider "moderate" and other people a "compromiser"

New Times. Mr. Chief Minister, we are very interested in the events in this country. You are one of the key figures on the political scene in South Africa. Therefore your opinion, your view of problems is very important for us. How would you define the situation in which your country now finds itself?

Dr. Mangosuhu the Buthelezi. I think we are on the verge of making a breakthrough for the first time. The main mistake of the whites was that for a long time they excluded black people from political developments. Mr. de Klerk has for the first time called blacks and whites together to sit at the conference table and work out a new constitution for the country. So we are on that now. The President and ourselves, the leaders of regional governments, had several meetings. At those meetings we decided to set up a working group for the preparation of a multi-party conference. An unfortunate thing, however, is the violence which has really bodevilled the situation, if I may use that word. First of all we need to call a multi-party conference just to discuss this problem of violence: it is quite clear that work on the constitution can hardly get off the ground if the other problem remains unsolved.

NT. Let's talk a little about the problem of violence. Its scale and forms are monstrous. What is the origin of it? Who is to blame for it?

M.B. I can give you a detailed documentation. When the African National Congress (ANC) couldn't penetrate the South African defence force, they started what they call the "people's war" where the people who were alleged to be working with the system were attacked. And this started some time ago. But as far as I personally am concerned, I'll show you a document which the ANC produced about their strategy in 1985, in which they said that I was a counterrevolutionary and therefore they must do all they can to deprive me of my social base. It's in black and white. I can show it to you.

NT. What about your relations with Nelson Mandela? Not long ago you met with him.

M.B. We were friends for a long time. But for almost a year some people from the ANC wouldn't allow him to meet with me, although we were always in contact with each other. Even when he was in jail we were in touch as old friends. When we were in our youth we were in the same organization together.

Finally we met in May, representantives of the ANC and of the Inkatha, and certain accords were produced, agreements for peace were made. Recently I met with Dr. Mandela again, at his request, in Durban. Our discussion lasted for about five and a half hours. And the problem now, I'd say, is that hardly a week after that I was quite amazed by his decision to issue the so-called "open letter" or ultimatum to the government. It was then that it was all over as far as our relationship is concerned.

NT. You know, during my meetings and conversations with people I've heard opinions which contradict one another, to my mind. Some people say that the Inkatha and the ANC are quite similar ideologically and even politically...

M.B. It is true.

NT. At the same time, I've heard the opinion that the Inkatha and the ANC are enemies ready to fight each other.

M.B. There has never been animosity on our side. But if you take the documents which contain all the things that the ANC has been saying about me, the things that some of their spokesmen are alleging, then you'll see that the animosity doesn't come from my side. But between Dr. Mandela and myself there has never been any quarrel, whilst in jail or outside. When I was in exile he never attacked me.

NT. How would you yourself define what is similar about your programmes and what is not?

M.B. Well, we are all anti-apartheid. All our life we fought against apartheid. The difference came about because of methods.

When the ANC was founded in 1912 it was an organization committed to a non-violent strategy. My colleagues and I were members of the Youth League of the ANC at the time when Nkomo was its President. He was succeeded by Chief Albert Nuthuli. Chief Albert Nuthuli won the Nobel Peace Prize, you know, precisely because the ANC at that time was operating on the basis of non-violence strategies. The ANC in exile then decided to opt for an armed struggle. I never supported an armed struggle myself. In any case, the decision of our fathers was right: to try to persuade people, to use methods other than violence, to put pressure on the authorities. The events in South Africa prove that I'm correct.

The ANC has probably taken its methods from

Mangosuthu BUTHELEZI, b. August 27,1928, a grandson of Dinuzulu, Supreme Chief of the Zulu people. Since 1970 Chief Minister of Kwazulu. Since 1974 President of the Inkatha Party. Mangosuthu Buthelezi has always been an opponet of the African National Congress of South Africa (ANC).

The Inkatha and the ANC have constant clashes on a religious and tribalist basis. From last August to date more than 2,000 people have lost their lives in those clashes.

Margaret Thatcher was a most welcome visitor in Kwazulu recently. The keynote of the cordial reception given to the British ex-Premier was: "Thank you for opposing sanctions." *Photos by the authors*

left-wingers. The government of South Africa has gravitated from the right. And now I am in the centre of the South African political scene where negotiations about the South African future are going to take place.

The ANC's position on sanctions is disappointing. I didn't think it was responsible leadership to call for an isolation of South Africa and for sanctions. This can only devastate South Africa. It's really no good for anyone, regardless of who rules in the end. He will not have the means to rule people in such a way that the people will get something out of it.

NT. Let's get a glimpse of the future. How, do you think, will national and political elements combine? What about political parties in South Africa in the future? Will they be national?

M.B. I believe in multi-party democracy. Multy-party democracy is a solution ensuring freedom for people to unite in different parties and to compete in the market of ideas for support.

NT. What about Bantustans? We were told that it was an effort to give some sort of freedom and independence to certain people. How do you see it? Is it a way for development?

M.B. Kwazulu, our Motherland, is not a Bantustan. We are the Zulu nation. I'm sure that the Russians have heard about the Zulus. I am sure people in your military academy know about the Zulu hordes of the army.

NT. Moscow has several military academies of various specializations.

M.B. I mean we are a nation. We've got a king even now and we are not a creation of the policy of the government. There are some areas in the Republic of South Africa which were created by the policy of the government, but we were not. We are not like Transkei or Ciskei. Therefore, we never supported the government policy of fragmenting the country into "white" South Africa and African "states," or Bantustans, set up on the basis of ethnicity. Kwazulu is our soil. But when we were conquered we were drawn into an agreement with the Union of South Africa without any consultation and we became part of South Africa. The Zulu-speaking black people of this country are the largest single ethnic language group out of blacks or whites of this country. But we say that history has created us as South Africans.

If you read the speeches of Mr. Viljoen*, or speeches by Mr. de Klerk himself you'd see that now they give us credit for opposing their policy of Bantustans, which has fallen short of their expectations. In fact, in the speech that Mr. de Klerk gave in the Parliament last year, in which he declared that he wanted apartheid eliminated, he actually gave me credit. He mentioned me as one of the people who helped him see the necessity of a new policy.

NT. What do you think about the future of South Africa, with all the people who are here: various races, quasi-independent Bantustans, and the influx of workers by the thousands from neighbouring countries (like Lesotho) who have a precarious existence here?

M.B. You also have quite a few ethnic groups in Russia, haven't you? What we had in the past was far from the best. We were accustomed to look up to the unitary state, to the British parliamentary system of one person – one vote. But we should look for other formulas. It's possible that the federal formula, for example, could help us better solve our problems in this country. But not on the basis of ethnicity. For instance, here in Kwazulu for many years now we have tried to have a multi-racial state which includes Indians, coloureds, whites, and ourselves. But it was the South African government which didn't want us to have it and kept on rejecting it and kept on frustrating us. But this is a route we've walked for a long time now.

NT. There is another question, a political and psychological one, so to speak. Is it easy or difficult to cooperate with the gov-

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*** Gerrit Viljoen** is South Africa's Minister of Constitutional Development and Planning. An interview with him was published in No. 27.

NT INFORMATION

● Bantustans

According to the programme of bantustanization, the basis of the policy of apartheid, South Africa is divided into the white Republic of South Africa and ten African "states," Bantustans, established in keeping with the tribal principle on 13 percent of South Africa's territory. The 1974 election programme of the Nationalist Party envisaged "adherence to territorial and political segregation and the division of the entire European and non-European population according to the place of residence and, as far as possible, in job placement."

Major Bantustans are: Transkei, Bophuthatswana, Venda, and Ciskei.

ernment or the party responsible for decades of vicious policy? It has been generally recognized today that apartheid was directed against the majority of the population, isn't it?

M.B. Many Africans have been colonized by whites and everywhere oppressed by white people, whether Portuguese, or English, or French. And when people ultimately achieved independence they had to cooperate with them. Take for instance Zimbabwe, formerly Southern Rhodesia. Since liberation from the British, Zimbabwe has not broken contacts with the former mother country. Extensive cooperation with the United Kingdom in many fields is a guarantee for the economic progress of the Zimbabwe people. So, I don't understand your question.

NT. I didn't say cooperation is impossible. I would like to see the psychological aspect of the matter. Is it cooperation or struggle? And what is the extent of either?

M.B. When a parent state realizes that it can't go on oppressing, which was happening in many parts of Africa, not just here, then there is no way in which you should not cooperate with it. Take for example Ivory Coast (Côte d'Ivoire – **Ed.**) and other countries of Francophone shades in Africa which have a very good working relationship with Paris even now.

Now South Africa is in another colonial situation, because white South Africans are actually not expatriates. White South Africans are actually indigenous to this country, just like Americans to America. So, there is no situation in Africa that can be compared with ours. South Africans are not to be compared with the others. The Portuguese here are still considered Portuguese in their mother country, whereas Afrikaners and other whites who have settled here are Africans. So, we decide now that the problem is not that they should go away, because they have no other country, but we have to live together with them, as with the Africans.

NT. I am far from forcing my ideas upon you, but, different as developments in your country and the Soviet Union are, they have certain similarities. Both social systems are on critical routes. They have freed themselves from the burden of the past and are striving for some new future. What do you think in this connection?

M.B. I agree, changes in the Soviet Union are very encouraging for me. I see a similarity in that much depends on an all-powerful head of state, who is the central figure for changes in South Africa just as in Russia. I see another similarity in that people in various regions in Russia also want to have more say, just like South African people want here. I think that for Mr. de Klerk to resolve the problem he should do it on the basis of the devolution of power from the centrist government. I think we need the devolution of power at the regional level.

NT. In our country some people say that this process is dangerous, because it means that the state is falling to pieces. Can't this process of giving power to regional authorities be dangerous?

M.B. No. I think that it's a really good thing to have power on a regional basis. People must feel that they have a voice at the local level, that they are the first level of the government. The central government can have only foreign affairs, the army, and things like the post office.

NT. But what unites the country besides those things which you mentioned, like the army, foreign policy, etc.?

M.B. What unites it? You see, the common thing is, we are proud to be South Africans, we don't want to be anything else but South Africans. Economy is another factor, because without economy only a sentimental satisfaction will result. Therefore, it is in the interests of the whole country that we should have one country, one economy if there is to be real development.

NT. There is another thing which people endlessly discuss: the pace of reforms. In my country everyone is dissatisfied with it. Some people say it is too slow, other people say it is too quick. What is the situation in your country?

M.B. I think it is very difficult to achieve a balance. I would say I don't know how any nation can test that. Taking, for instance, what Mr. de Klerk is doing in this country, honestly, we don't think that he could do this quicker than he is doing. We don't think that he could have done better than he is doing. There are, though, some people who say he is going too fast, and other people who say that he is too slow.

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New Soviet immigrants in Israel

Last year more than 200,000 Soviet immigrants arrived in Israel: that is almost 5 percent of Israel's Jewish population

Shlomo Avineri,
professor of political science at
the University in Jerusalem

Such numbers are beginning to be a critical mass, affecting many areas of Israeli life. Of course the problems of absorption in work, housing and education are not always easy – but Israel has a long, and relatively successful tradition of absorbing immigrants from many lands and diverse cultures. But in the case of Soviet immigrants, another factor is at work.

In many fundamental aspects, Israel – and the Zionist ideology which brought it about – are a product of East European, and hence Russian, intellectual and social developments. The emergence of Zionism as a movement for Jewish social, spiritual and political renaissance originated in the second half of the 19th century among Jews living in the Russian Empire – at that time the largest Jewish concentration of people in the world. The classic writers of modern Hebrew literature – taught in every Israeli school – people like Bialik, Tschernichowsky and Berditchevsky – have written and worked in Odessa, and in their writings the influence of Chekhov, Pushkin and Turgenev can be clearly seen: in a way, modern Hebrew literature is a microcosm of the literary and spiritual trends of Russian intellectual life in the 19th century.

Israel's political parties, both right and left, have been strongly influenced by the ideology and political trends of East European origin. Debates between various Israeli socialist and social-democratic parties have echoed debates among Bolsheviks, Mensheviks and Social-Revolutionaries. Israeli communal villages – kibbutzim and moshavim – have been greatly ispired by Russian narodnik ideas, just as many ideas of the "Ethical Socialism" of Israeli thinkers draw heavily on Tolstoyan influences. Many would also suggest that some Israeli bureaucratic behaviour also resembles East European, and specifically, Russian models.

The influx of Soviet immigrants is now greatly strengthening these elements, and though Soviet immigrants have to overcome a difficult and sometimes painful barrier of language, the culture as such is not totally alien to them. A Soviet Jewish immigrant coming to America will find himself, paradoxically, in a much more alien environment than the one coming to Israel. Who in Brooklyn or Los Angeles would like to discuss Lermontov, argue about Lenin and Plekhanov, feel at home in mellow, sweet yet sorrowful Russian music? In Tel Aviv and Jerusalem, the atmosphere is more East European than probably anywhere else outside of Eastern Europe itself. Even the Byzantine intrigues of Israeli politics are sometimes more reminiscent of what occurs in Moscow than what happens in Washington.

What is the immigrants' own view about Russia, the Soviet Union? It is understandbly ambivalent, but it is very different from the strong anti-Soviet feelings of the immigrants who arrived here from the Soviet Union in the early 1980's. Those immigrants were mostly people who had been persecuted by the Soviet government even for their expression of Jewish identity in the learning of Hebrew and their national and religious feeling. After spending time in a Soviet jail for teaching Hebrew you do not feel overtly friendly to the communist system. The recent immigrants are different: first, they come from a different Soviet Union, infused with the spirit of glasnost; most of them are not Zionist and have very little Jewish religious or national education. They leave the Soviet Union mainly due to the internal conditions there, and what they look for in Israel is security, as feeling of being "at home," decent jobs, education and a professional future for their children. They do not carry with them a resentment against their country of birth – on the contrary. And politically, they do not tend to be supporters of extreme right-wing Israel religious or nationalist parties. They are people of the middle class: urban professionals, liberal in their politics and attitudes, humanistic in their approach.

With the development of relations between the Soviet Union and its constituent republics and Israel, it is these immigrants who will be the bridge between the two countries, peoples and cultures. An historical link between Russian culture and Hebrew culture is being re-established, an historical circle is being closed. Both peoples should be grateful to this unique historical opportunity.

JERUSALEM

Immigrants in Israel: with empty pockets and great hopes

Roofs over heads... on the Western Bank
Photo from Falestine Al-Thawra (PLO)

A German lesson for Russia

If history teaches any lessons, the German lesson would be the one for us to learn

Irina Mlechina

The situation that took shape in Germany after the war had no precedent in history. It was unique. And yet that situation was in a way similar to the situation Soviet society is now in. That is why the German lesson must be heeded by the Soviet people as well as all other peoples who have experienced dictatorship or cherished a globally dangerous blind devotion to "national ideas."

Today many experts refer, and quite rightly, to the experience of economic reforms in West Germany. The reforms were highly successful, and very soon they propelled the Federal Republic to becoming one of the world's major economic giants. However, remembering the German Wirtschaftswunder, one should not ignore the political, cultural and moral climate that made the miracle possible. In this respect the German experience is exceptionally instructive, too.

Let us try and imagine the year 1945 in Germany. The total war has just ended with total defeat: hunger, cold, poverty, struggle to survive, crippled soldiers returning from the front, hordes of refugees, orphaned children in the ruins, an atmosphere of despair, disappointment, and a total lack of faith. In November 1945 Karl Jaspers wrote: "We have lost almost all we had: the state, the economy, the reliable conditions of physical being, and, which is a great deal worse, the commonly accepted mutually binding norms, moral dignity, national awareness making us one people." It seemed that everything had been lost, including what Jaspers called "the property of memory."

The phrase "Zero Hour" seems to be the best description of the hopeless situation in which people could find no support in the deadly spiritual void. Everything seemed suspicious and aroused mistrust, including the very German language defamed by Nazi usage. The Germans had to start a new life on the ruined foundations, creating it in the misty and almost surreal world of smoking debris and booming black market.

German writers have many times spoken about "the blessing of defeat." This "blessing" was first and foremost reflected in the cardinal rejection of the past and a principled reevaluation of values. It was a way out from savagery, spiritual rebirth of the nation, which is impossible without the admittal of individual and common guilt, self-purification and repentance.

Karl Jaspers called his 1946 book *The Question of Guilt*, thus encouraging the process of self-realization which went on among German intellectuals. The Germans, Jaspers reminded, were politically responsible for the regime, the regime's crimes, for Hitler who had been allowed to come to lead the nation, and for unconditional obedience to the adventurist who had involved the German nation in crimes.

The moral guilt when man has no other authority to honour but man's own conscience is more important than political guilt; this is metaphysical guilt, the matter of one's soul and heart, of self-awareness and self-definition. Jaspers reminded: the fact that society admits its responsibility is the first indication that society's political freedom is waking up.

Many people in Germany were unprepared for a principled rejection of the past, slowly and painfully making their progress towards the realization of the essence of the catastrophe that befell their country. However, while the majority of the people tried to get out of the chaos without burdening themselves with difficult thoughts, the process of critical reassessment, the desire to cleanse oneself were defining the spiritual atmosphere of society. The rejection of the past on all levels of political and cultural life became an important prerequisite and the background of a profound cardinal restructuring and radical economic changes. New impulses, initiatives and concepts were generated by discussions aimed at the search of radically new ways to shape life.

"The blessing of defeat" also meant an allergy to militarism which had become a natural result of twenty years of militarized fascist dictatorship and the defeat in the war. Democratically-minded intellectuals believed that this process of spiritual and political demilitarization was too slow and imperfect, and they were right.

However, the rejection of the very idea of militarism by the public was so strong that most people felt an instinctive aversion to anything that was associated with war or dictatorship – the military, weapons, armies, marching troops. One may object that very soon the Federal Republic joined the Paris accords, created the Bundeswehr and the bellicose German spirit did not disappear simultaneously with the signing of the act of unconditional surrender – all this will be a correct objection. Nonetheless, it is evident that West Germany appeared on the political arena as a peace-loving state. The liberation from militaristic doctrines was one of the most important elements in the rejection of the past and a prerequisite for economic prosperity – at least because tremendous sums of money did not have to be spent on the upkeep of a mammoth army, on nuclear arms or participation in regional conflicts.

The cardinal rejection of the past meant first and foremost the rejection of the ideology of violence in its totalitarian form, of National-Socialist myths about the German nation being the chosen one, about "a special historical mission" and "racial superiority," of nationalism in general, which under despotic regimes is interpreted as the basis of "the healthy national spirit." It goes without saying that but for this resolute rejection of past errors, the Germans would not have been able to build a prosperous economy.

Naturally, one should not idealize or simplify the spiritual situation in postwar Germany, believing that all Germans were possessed by the thirst for self-redemption. German writers and thinkers said a lot of bitter words about "the inability to lament," about the incompleteness of repentance, the lingering desire to shift the blame onto others and to avoid the feeling of personal guilt. Besides, very often denazification was reduced to a bureaucratic procedure, a farce becoming the target of venomous satire for the democratic press. But nonetheless this process produced the main result – the atmosphere of the majority's rejection of any totalitarian and chauvinistic ideas.

The rejection of the ideology of violence was the first and most important landmark on the way to individual and public freedom, without which the search for new economic ways would have been doomed to failure. This may easily be Germany's most important historical lesson. From the very start the efforts of the democratically elected politicians were focused on the creation and strengthening of a form of statehood and social life that would guarantee Germany's joining the free world and the international community. The German politicians were guided by the desire to prevent the emerging West German state from ever becoming the victim of dictators and irresponsible demagogues.

Konrad Adenauer, Ludwig Erhard, Willy Brandt... whose visions of their country's future were often different and who belonged to different political parties, did much to direct West Germany along the democratic path

The leaders who shaped up the initial stages of West Germany's development were guided by anxiety for the young state that had no democratic experience (except the brief spell of the Weimar Republic), the desire to irradicate Nazism and to create a state based on freedom and respect for human rights. These efforts played a stabilizing role in the turbulent atmosphere of that time (one British correspondent who attended the first Bundestag elections in Germany said the new German legislature was one third Reichstag, two thirds kindergarten).

Politicians like Adenauer, Heuss, Schumacher, Wenner, Brandt and Erhard, whose visions of their country's future were often different and who belonged to different political parties, did much to direct West Germany along the democratic path, to introduce Germany to the common European home, as we would describe it today. They also played the key role in defining the foreign political course oriented towards reconciliation with the rest of the world, which meant Germany's moral rehabilitation.

Especially important is the role of the first president of West Germany, Theodor Heuss, who became a major integrating figure. In the memory of his contemporaries Theodor Heuss was a person who relied on the strength and attractiveness of his highly humane personality rather than on the strength of power and his position. His utterances and actions were not dictated by egoistic or ambitious considerations, but by a sense of enormous responsibility. That is why as the head of state he helped Germans acquire a new self-consciousness.

One cannot avoid mentioning one more factor – the role of the Allies, especially the United States. Many Germans resented the Allied programme of reeducation. But it worked and served its purpose. This programme pursued two main goals: to restore German spiritual values buried under the ideological ruins of the Reich, and to eradicate nationalist and militaristic manifestations from social life. America was prepared to help (through the Marshall Plan), but the Germans were supposed to reshape their life and to work themselves.

General Eisenhower, commander of the American contingent in Germany, addressed the Germans in the following way in October 1945: "The moral, spiritual and material rebirth of Germany must come from the people of Germany. We will help the German people in achieving this rebirth, but by no means will we do the German work for the Germans. The German people must understand: to survive this hard winter, they must get rid of the gregarious instinct they have been obsessed by for the past twelve years. Germany must become a land of peaceful workers, in which each person can realize his or her capabilities – otherwise Germany will have no future..."

The desire to compensate for moral and material losses, especially visible in younger generations, was the guarantee of an active and rather quick process of German integration into the Western community, the foundation of the cultural-ethic reorientation and economic renewal. Openness to the West saved Germany. This openness was based on the resolute rejection of racial and nationalist prejudice, recognition of human rights and dignity, individual emancipation. The main credit for this is due to the Germans themselves, despite the tremendous role of the American and European culture. The transformation of the country through the efforts of that country's own people epitomizes the processes that went on in Germany and helps draw the necessary conclusions.

The concepts of freedom, free choice and responsibility of each for the destiny chosen were becoming the key notions replacing the false pathos of Nazi collectivism. Naturally, all this would not have been possible without consistent, in-depth national self-criticism, radical rejection of the ideology of coercion, without the return to the fundamental ethical values desecrated and destroyed during the years of Nazi rule. This was a difficult process which encountered a number of frustrations, but it was an irreversible one.

Over two decades ago the well-known writer Siegfried Lenz wrote the novel, *A German Lesson,* which won him a global fame. The young hero of the novel serving a term in a juvenile correction camp is trying to sort things out in his life, the early years of which coincided with the time of Nazi rule. But the German lesson proved to be broader and deeper: it is applicable to individual destinies and to destinies of whole nations. And if we want to benefit from it, the main conclusion should be as follows: a country whose citizens do not feel free and responsible cannot develop successfully; without freedom and responsibility society does not survive.

In the context of radical democratic renewal, in the presence of important integrating figures who are absolutely trusted by the people, it became possible to inspire in Germans the hope for a better life and to set them on the path of active construction. Moreover, the content and the ultimate goal of the socio-economic programmes were not personal profit or elevation to power, but the prosperity of the whole German nation.

Prosperity for All is a book by Ludwig Erhard and is now widely available in Moscow in the Russian translation. It is very useful for all those who are at least remotely interested in a better life for this country. But studying this book we must remember that German prosperity had been conceived and achieved in inseparable connection with the working out and observance of legal norms guaranteeing decent living standards for the people. Prosperity was created by the work of all people in a favourable moral and spiritual climate.

■

White night bonfire

How GULAG prisoners are crippled

Valery Abramkin, Head, Centre for a More Humanitarian Penitentiary System

Valentina Chesnokova, the centre's sociological researcher

Vladimir Kupriyanov, picture credits

Excerpted from an interview with Reshat Djemilev

Born in the Crimea in 1933. Following Crimean Tatar deportation in 1944 lived in Uzbekistan. A leader of the Crimean Tatar movement for repatriation. Repeatedly illegally harrassed for involvement in human rights movement by bans on work, administrative detention, deportation, etc. Spent some seven years in jails and concentration camps. First time penalized under frame-up in 1957-58. In 1972 and 1979, twice sentenced to a three-year term under Article 190/1 of the Russian Federation Criminal Code for "systematic circulation by word of mouth of wilfully false inventions defaming the Soviet state and social system." This interview was taken in December 1988.

Before I was arrested in 1957, I held the job of work superviser at the building site of a ferro-concrete plant in Begavet. As the plant was built by convicts, I initially had the outsider's view of what their life was like before I myself became a convict. At the time there operated a system under which each day of 120 percent quota overfulfilment counted as three days off the term. As prisoners for the most part had a stake in that, wanting to secure early release, they worked with a will and sought to avoid transgressions.

At that time prisoners got money and could buy what they needed without any restriction. Generally speaking, there were none of those restrictions we have today. Thus, I for one even got hot cooked meals from home, which could be arranged every day without hindrance. I treated campmates who had no relatives at hand.

The prisoners had enough to eat and did not bother to cadge a slice of bread. They worked conscientiously. Thus, we would get up early in the morning, without having the warders shake us awake or slap us in the punishment block for breaking the rules. The team leader decided everything, thus he could let you stay in if you were feeling poorly, as he was responsible for the planned quota, the job in hand and general discipline. As a rule, he would be a knowledgeable, respected fellow. We never had the fuzz in the camp, only the troop warder would look in to see whether everything was alright and to give a talk to his charges, who would attend or not, as they pleased. The penal colony governor gave lectures and chats on Sundays, while generally, the relationship between convicts and administration was normal, human.

What I saw later on in 1972 and the more so in 1980, was simply a nightmare. A whole range of restrictions was imposed as regards the sending of letters and parcels, meetings with relatives and the issue of money. The camp regime was far tougher now. Inside, the territory would be fenced off into local zones with barred walls about eight metres high, in short, a prison within a prison. Convicts could not communicate and even inside the zone concourse was forbidden. Naturally, that all weighed down upon the prisoner, who raged against state and

society. Listen to what they say, how infuriated they are with this system. Why is this done? Some idiot, I don't know who, but certainly no human being, just a devil dreams up more and more restrictions to crush every human. As a result, people are turned into automatons, everything is done to get them lose every shred of self-respect and dignity.

Thus, whenever a prisoner may chance to look askance at a warder or at the governor or his deputy, or chance to forget to say "hello" to him or doff his cap, he is harassed.

Back in the 1950s, practically nobody peached except for a few who did that on the sly. That was not the wholesale phenomenon it was in the 1970s and especially the 1980s. In fact, warders seem to compete among themselves as to who has a longer list of stoolies. True, in the 1970s, when I was in the seventh Krasnoyarsk penal colony, there still was some semblance of decency and at least the stoolies were afraid of being exposed, but in 1980, in the Norilsk colony, not one stoolie was afraid or ashamed of what he was doing, that was dubbed "delivering a hide."

Convicts would be incarcerated for three or four months at a stretch in the punishment block for failing to fulfil the output quota. I remember a prisoner in Norilsk who was dumped in the punishment cell for refusing to do the job he considered shameful. This prisoner, Misha Belyayev, did not refuse to work generally, but simply wanted another job. He was reduced almost to a walking skeleton, the poor sod, after these endless stretches in the punishment block. But as if that was not enough, he was abused, beaten up and straitjacketed, moreover without the sanction of a doctor or prosecutor. One such "tutor" there was a certain Victor Ivanovich Babenkov, nicknamed Gromadsky after the Gromadsky high-risk penal colony, where he had been employed earlier. He bossed this straitjacketing process, himself demonstrating how the prisoner should be "reformed." Thus, the straitjacketed prisoner would lie there, barely breathing, while Gromadsky jumped up and down on him, cracking his ribs.

> "Prisoners were reduced to gobbling iron nails and electrodes merely to be transferred"

Prisoners were reduced to swallowing 150-mm nails, electrodes, any iron thing so as to be transferred to the hospital bay and have stomachs cut open to extricate these items, all in hope of subsequently being transferred to some other place. They crippled themselves to achieve that.

Prisoners wounded and immolated themselves. Again in a worker cell in that Norilsk camp, a young lad made a fire out of greasy rags and paper and stood in it. I don't know how gravely he was burned, as he was dragged away into solitary. Another chap, an Armenian, a rather husky guy who stammered, was reduced to the point of barking at electric bulbs. He was put in solitary in the punishment block and to get him stop barking, he was doused with cold water through the trap window, in the midst of winter, mind you. Only later was he transferred to another jail.

For them the convict is not a human being. They have no qualms about frankly telling us that we are not human beings. As a result, the prisoner either cripples himself or becomes an enemy of the state.

After four stretches in the punishment cells, I was hauled in front of a commission which was to decide whether I be transferred to the camp jail. As a rule, members of the local Soviet's "supervisory commission" sat on these commissions. In my case the "supervisory commission" was represented by a grey-haired school principal, who tells me the following: "How could you, an elderly person with evidently an education chalk up a list of 18 transgressions? If you were young, it would be pardonable, but can't you really quietly obey the camp regime?"

I answer: "Look here, I don't have an inkling of what these 18 transgressions amount to... Can't you imagine how I'm treated here? I have appealed to the prosecutor, sending a copy for the deputy governor, so that they pay notice and stop faking these transgressions."

The school principal is surprised. "Do you mean to say you address appeals?" he asks and opens up my file. "Oh my, how much there is here," he adds. To which I say: "Look, there you are. You don't even read what is put before you, except for the

little notice that he – and I indicate Beloborodov, the deputy governor – has drawn up for you, and he was the man who arranged all these transgressions. While you," I continue, "though with grey hair by now haven't even noticed how many young chaps have mutilated themselves here. You never wondered what made them do that."

"Well then," the school principal proposes, "give him three months in the camp jail, after all, he's not that young."

Beloborodov chimes in: "But the administration wants to have him put away for six months."

"Let's take into consideration his age and the fact that it's the first time," the representative of Soviet power drawls. "Won't three months be enough?" "But the administration wants six." "All right then, let be six. You may go."

I went to the cell, taking a piece of a razor blade with me and slit open my veins on both arms. They were all bloody and the blade slipped: it seemed that the skin of the throat wouldn't yield . I yell: "Beloborodov, bring a cup, I'll pour blood in it, as a few drops aren't enough for you. So you can have a whole cup!"

A little later the trap window opens, the screw looks in and says: "Why on earth you open up your veins? What does that prove?"

I say: "I don't intend to prove anything to anyone. It's simply my way of protesting against your club law."

For the most part the convicts do not have to be forced to work. On the contrary, they want to work, as one has to help his family, another has to pay the debt owed, and money is also needed for the tuck shop. There are of course some who won't work out of principle, but they're few, and I think they shouldn't be forced to work. Just provide the conditions, the opportunity to secure pre-term release and let the prisoner himself decide, whether he wants that or not. If he works, it means he gets out sooner, if he doesn't, then he'll have to serve out the entire term.

> "A prisoner will make a kitchen set for a warder or governor for just ten bricks of tea"

Force engenders reaction. When a guy is straitjacketed and has the warder jumping up and down on top of him, he's not being reformed. It only gets him to resist still more. Take Misha Belyayev. When he was straitjacketed and Babenkov started jumping up and down on him, he stayed mute. "Just look," Babenkov was astonished. "Isn't saying anything!" His ribs were cracked, but he hates the fuzz so much that he'd gut anyone of them if he could.

There, they all say, it's the criminal underworld. Is that really so? When one cut hay on a collective farm field to feed his cattle and was given a four-year term for "embezzling" collective farm property. Or when another who garnered wheat though it was raining all the time and nobody bothered otherwise, but he was sentenced to a three-year term for that. Is that the criminal underworld for you? I met a chap there who'd been in for 36 years without a day out. Thirty-six years, mind you. In 1984 I sent in an appeal for a pardon for him, and he was released. He hadn't seen the outside world and had no idea of what was going on there, as he had been in prison since he was eleven years old. An Uzbek by nationality, he could not tolerate insults. Thus, when called a brute, he would knife the guy who said that or do something else to him. For this his prison sentence was prolonged until it added up to 36 years all told.

In effect, the penal colony administration makes criminals out of ordinary normal human beings, like Misha Belyayev, for instance. Incidentally, the professional criminals, the thieves and the "coloured," as they are called, appear far more sympathetic to the prison administration, while the "law" they keep seems fair and just.

I'd say that the Norilsk penal colony was the worst. Nothing but endless provocations and the egging on of one prisoner against another. Before a prisoner is dragged into the punishment block, he is thoroughly frisked and made to change his clothes. Yet one may come in with a knife and engineer a provocation or even knife a prisoner whom the administration dislikes. Such things happened in Norilsk and unquestionably with the administration's connivance.

Such club law enables the administration to steal. Bedroom, dining-room and kitchen sets are ordered, with the prisoner getting ten bricks of tea, of 250 grammes each. Ten bricks of tea was enough to ensure a warder or governor with a kitchen set. If the prisoner thought to refuse, he would be tossed into the punishment block or even straitjacketed.

Comparing the three periods in the penitentiary system, the Khrushchevian camps, at least up to the start of the 1960s, were best as regards conditions, as a result of which convicts indeed reformed. But later on, when new legislation was promulgated and the GULAG camps were classified according to regime, the situation deteriorated with each year.

Read our next issue for an account of what life is like in a cell for former Interior Ministry staffers

The hidden tears of the Celestial Empire

Amnesty International and Asia Watch on the human rights situation in China

Since the time of the Cultural Revolution, executions are as a rule carried out in China in the presence of great masses of people. Groups of prisoners are usually taken to the execution ground in the back of open lorries, with their arms tightly bound behind their backs. As it proceeds to the execution ground, the column of lorries stops here and there and improvised meetings are held. Prisoners used in such displays are usually made to bow their heads with paper caps on them and to wear paper placards indicating their name and the crime of which they are accused. (For the Chinese, moral execution is more terrible than a physical one.) Sometimes the whole procedure is televised. The finale is usually one and the same: death by a firing squad.

Though the Chinese authorities do not publish statistics about death sentences or executions, the death penalty is known to be widely used in China. According to Chinese law, offences punishable by death include theft, embezzlement, smuggling, and other economic offences. Amnesty International recorded more than 960 death sentences in 1990, including 750 executions. It recorded over 180 death sentences in January and February 1991, of which at least 120 were carried out. Amnesty International believes the actual figures to be far higher: the statistics are not always made public.

There has been a rise in the frequency of the application of the death penalty to political prisoners who are sentenced to death for criminal offences they never committed. According to official information, over 50 people were sentenced to death for "counter-revolutionary" activities in the aftermath of the 1989 crackdown on pro-democracy protesters. Amnesty International observers believe the actual number of executed prisoners of conscience to be much higher. Several hundred people were secretly executed in various places within or near the capital between June and August 1989. They included a group of people who had refused to leave Tiananmen Square in the early hours of June 4, 1989.

Those who have not repented

What is the number of prisoners in China? Until very recently the Chinese authorities refused to answer this question. When interviewed several

days ago, the Chinese Minister of Justice said 1,260 thousand Chinese were held in 600 prisons and camps for "reeducation through labour." However, these figures are much lower than the number circulating in the West, which amounts to 20 million prisoners.

The number of detainees increased sharply after the June 4, 1989 events in Tiananmen Square. According to international human rights organizations, the number of people arrested for taking part in pro-democracy protests varies from 10 to 30 thousand. The fate of the majority of them remains unknown. Official information does not specify at all how many people are being kept behind bars on political grounds. Official sources announced the release of 881 people in 1990 and of an additional 69 in early 1991. They also reported in early April 1991 that 787 people had been tried in Beijing in connection with the 1989 protests.

A public execution of pro-democracy protesters: "education of the masses?"

As a rule, Chinese dissidents are sentenced to long terms of imprisonment. The sad record belongs to Chen Lantao, a 27-year-old staff member of the Beihai branch of the National Oceanographic Bureau in Qingdao, Shandong Province. During the 1989 pro-democracy movement, he took part in demonstrations and made public speeches in Qingdao, denouncing the government suppression of the protesters and calling on the Chinense Communist Party to step down. Arrested in June 1989, he was sentenced three months later to 18 years in prison on charges of "counter-revolutionary propaganda and agitation" and "disturbing social order and traffic." Other Chinese dissidents hold records of the time they spent behind bars. Easily the most well-known Chinese dissident, Wei Jingsheng, has spent almost 12 years in prison. An electrician by trade, he was sentenced in 1979 to fifteen years for advocating democratic reforms at the peak of the Wall of Democracy movement.

The trial of dissidents Chen Ziming and Wang Juntao evoked a great public response in Beijing. Both became known for the first time in April 1976, when they participated in Tiananmen Square demonstrations of protest against the Gang of Four, for which Wang was later sentenced to several years in prison. During the 1991 trial, these two "major counter-revolutionaries received 13 years' imprisonment plus four years' deprivation of political rights each. The severe punishment applied to them is, evidently, explained by their "refusal to repent." Chen Ziming and Wang Juntao were given less than a week to prepare their defence. Their lawyers were reportedly given only four days to read through voluminous files of prosecution evidence which amounted to nearly 3,000 pages. Both Wang Juntao and Chen Ziming pleaded not guilty at their trial and appealed against the verdict. The two lawyers of Wang Juntao abandoned his appeal. One of them reportedly told his client's wife that the authorities threatened to fire him and to cross his name off the list for a flat if he supported the appeal. The lawyer who represented Chen Ziming had his licence revoked by the Ministry of Justice, making it impossible for him to practice law.

Though official sources have asserted that these trials were public, foreign journalists, diplomats and independent observers were barred from them. This appears to contradict Article 111 of the Criminal Procedure Law, which provides that all cases are heard in public in the first instance, except those involving state secrets.

Writing letters to Bush

In March 1991, Luo Haixing, a Hong Kong businessman, was sentenced by a court in Guangzhou to 5 years' imprisonment on charges of "concealing counterrevolutionary elements," meaning that he helped pro-democracy activists escape arrest and severe punishment. Luo Haixing had spent over 16 months in custody by the time he was tried, even though Chinese law stipulates that preliminary detention time may not exceed one week. His lawyer was notified of the trial only a few hours before it took place. Luo Haixing filed an appeal against the verdict, but the provincial high court which heard the appeal did so internally without notifying Luo Haixing's lawyers, and announced that the original ruling was upheld.

In May this year Luo Haixing found an original way to avenge himself. He wrote a letter to his wife, telling her that he was working at a special workshop producing artificial flowers on the orders of Hong Kong firms. His wife did her best to make her husband's letter known to the broad public, especially in the United States. The use of prisoners for the production of export-bound goods in China touched off a wave of indignation in the United States. American lawmakers demanded that China be stripped of its "most favoured nation" status. President Bush had to step in to calm down the passions, promising the Congress that his administration would study the problem seriously.

Chinese repressions are directed not only against dissidents who oppose Marxism-Leninism and the ideas of Mao, but also believers, including Catholics, Protestants and Buddhists... According to Amnesty International, Father Francis Wang Yijun, the 75-year-old Roman Catholic Vicar General of Wenzhou diocese in Zhejiang province, was sentenced in February 1990 to three years of "reeducation through labour." Father Wang had previously spent 13 years in prison because of his religious convictions. Upon his release in February 1990 he was immediately sentenced to another three years because, as

the official notice said, while serving his previous sentence, "he still refused to repent and accept the government's educational liberation. He resisted reform, continued to maintain illegal ties with the underground Catholic Church in Wenzhou, and instigated Christian believers against the religious policy and lawful decrees of our People's Government."

Repressions in Tibet

In the Tibet Autonomous Region, people are being arrested for their desire to live according to their faith and to worship Buddha. After Chinese troops invaded Tibet forty years ago, Beijing started turning out mass circulations of books about former slaves who had found freedom under socialism. Reports are being published about first Tibetan graduates of Chinese universities and successful Tibetan businessmen. In the past few years, life expectancy has nearly doubled in Tibet, and the Beijing government has built schools, hospitals and roads... However, anything connected with the Tibetan national culture, religion and traditions is being mercilessly irradicated. Over 50 massive uprisings have been supressed in Tibet. In the past few years, about 1.2 million people have been killed there, which amounts to one sixth of the whole Tibetan nation. According to international human rights organizations, tens of thousands of Tibetans have been repressed since the massive uprising in September 1987. A representative of Asia Watch thus assessed Chinese rule in Tibet: "The invasion of the National Liberation Army in Tibet and subsequent annexation of Tibet resulted in catastrophic consequences for the local people, especially in the time of the Cultural Revolution. Buddhist temples and shrines were destroyed barbarically. In addition, there was a massive influx of Chinese to Tibet and as a result, Tibetans became an ethnic minority in their own land..."

The number of people who remain imprisoned for political reasons throughout Tibet is not known, but about 200 are believed to still be held in the Tibetan capital Lhasa. Most prisoners continue to be held without trial, including some who were assigned to administrative detention for up to three years for peacefully advocating Tibetan independence. According to official sources, 97 Tibetans, including many young nuns, were assigned without trial to "reeducation through labour" between September 1987 and 1991. Some juvenile prisoners, arrested for peaceful political activities, are reported to have been imprisoned together with adult prisoners.

Tibetans suspected of opposing government policies continued to be arrested in other areas populated by Tibetans. Those arrested outside the Tibetan Autonomous Region reportedly included Agyal Tsering, a Buddhist monk who was detained in February 1990 in Qinghai province for allegedly printing and distributing a leaflet urging Tibetan independence. He was apparently held incommunicado for several weeks immediately after his arrest and sentenced to 18 months' imprisonment in July 1990.

This practice is reportedly resorted to in other areas of China, including the Xinjiang Autonomous Region largely populated by Muslims. Over 6,000 were arrested and convicted of "fomenting rebellion" in connection with unrest in Baren township near Kashgar in April 1990. Official sources described the unrest in Baren as a "counter-revolutionary riot" provoked by "separatists." According to unofficial sources, violent clashes between civilians and police occurred when police denied access to a mosque to several hundred Muslim pilgrims. In September 1990, the authorities in Xinjiang promulgated regulations, setting strict limits on religious activities.

The story of a Lhasa tailor

Chinese laws are humane enough and correspond to the legal norms accepted in democratic states. In particular, Chinese law prohibits torture and ill-treatment of prisoners. However, these laws are violated now and then in practice. According to official sources, in 1990 alone Chinese courts considered 4,511 cases of human rights violations.

Topygal, a tailor from Lhasa, arrested in April 1990 for possessing a video cassette showing pictures of the Dalai-Lama, was severely beaten while held incommunicado for several days in a police station.

Topygal was lucky: the violators were punished after he filed a complaint. As a rule, though, prisoners' protests are not heeded.

Western anaslysts agree that gradual shifts have been taking place in Beijing's approach to human rights since the end of last year. In December 1990, Richard Schifter, Assistant Secretary of State for Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs, visited the Chinese capital. In July of this year, Chinese authorities allowed Australian human rights activists to visit Tibet. However, many experts regard these developments as nothing but one more round of diplomatic game.

Ivan Shomov

Photo from Stern (FRG)

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A state of emergency

No serious leader would think of calling off a state of emergency once it had been declared

Leonid Ionin

As the German writer Reinhard Lettau put it, the question of a state of emergency is a purely linguistic one. I'd rather call it a question of logic.

Indeed, suppose that the USSR Supreme Soviet declared a state of emergency in the country at the urgent request of the ministers of Defence, the Interior, and State Security. Or that the President declared a state of emergency by decree. What would happen next?

I visualize the subsequent situation as follows: street meetings, demonstrations, and strikes would be banned; strict censorship would be introduced over both democratic and conservative publications; the borders would be closed; freedom of movement inside the country would be restricted; the implacable opponents of the regime would be taken into preventive custody. A special decree would be issued proclaiming null and void a number of legislative acts adopted by certain Union republics. The republics' customs posts and other fences interfering with the exercise of centralized power would be abolished. Local chief executives would be replaced by new ones, placed under house arrest, or banished abroad. Besides that, extraordinary measures would be taken to regulate the economy: a strict discipline of supplies and pricing would be imposed, and violations of work discipline would be cracked down on. Trading and mediatory cooperatives would be closed, and as far as production cooperatives are concerned, the only ones which would survive would be those prepared and able to meet government orders for the delivery of certain quantities of products by a certain deadline to certain addresses and at certain prices. The state would subsidize such cooperatives and keep them supplied with materials and equipment. Profiteering would be cut short with an iron hand: food and consumer goods would be distributed by the state on principles of social justice.

Violations of human rights would be out of the question. They would be strictly observed. These, however, would be the genuine rights of the working people, not those of hooligans, black marketeers, and other parasites.

The appropriate headquarters-ministries would have a full list of measures printed on officially stamped circular letters, and would specify those responsible for their implementation. At the command from the top, messengers would set out in various directions, and the state machinery would be put into action. Our country has never been lacking in diligent civil servants above reproach, with their hands clean, their hearts warm, and their heads cool. The much-coveted quiet and order would reign on one-sixth of the globe; the war of laws would end; a train leaving station A would always arrive at station B; the need for the agonizing political choice would obviate itself; the Mercedes and Toyota limousines, bought on unearned money, would be confiscated lest they should irritate our hard-working ordinary citizens any longer; Armenians and Azerbaijanians would get along well at work; potatoes would become cheaper; newspapers would be unanimous; the ugly words like "stock exchange", "unemployment", and "millionaire" would disappear from our vocabulary; and the state budget would look as good as our Prime Minister does.

Problems would remain, of course. These, however, would be entirely different problems easily surmountable in an atmosphere of unanimity and absolute clarity. The recipes for success are well-known: "In order to live beter it is necessary to work more and better", "In order to live in peace it is necessary to exterminate the enemies." Now we do not know for sure who our enemies are and cannot tell them from our friends. Once we are quite clear on this point, we shall make short work of our enemies in no time. In doing that we shall draw on our rich experience gained over the decades.

In general, there seems to be nothing terrible about a state of emergency. We must introduce it as soon as possible, so that our much-suffering country can finally restore order and regain its dignity for all the world to see.

However, this involves the logical problem I have mentioned in the opening paragraph.

What is "a state of emergency?" Let's look up the phrase in Dahl's Dictionasry. "A state of emergency," it says, "is an extraordinary situation." Consequently, a state of emergency is an abnormal state, and by insisting on the introduction of a state of emergency, the esteemed Ministers and Deputies of the Supreme Soviet imply that the present state of affairs is perfectly normal. In that case, why do we need this state of emergency?

This, however, is not the only logical snag in the state of emergency idea. Let us elaborate on that. Being "extraordinary," a state of emergency is introduced temporary. A permanent state of emergency would make no sense. A permanent state of emergency is, according to logical classification, "contradictio in adjecto."

Consequently, a state of emergency would have to be called off sooner or later. Isn't it ridiculous? First, we introduce a state of emergency, i.e. impose restrictions, issue special decrees, enforce law and order – and then we call the whole thing off to start up once again with amateur politicians, discussions, unrest, profiteers, cooperators, – to relapse into the troublesome situation we have rectified thanks to a state of emergency.

Obviously, no sober-minded ministers, deputies, and generals will accept such a line of action. There are two courses open to them in dealing with the problem. The first one is to keep saying, for decades on end, that not all the purposes of a state of emergency have been achieved yet and, therefore, it has to be maintained for another decade; another two decades; and so on, and so forth. As more and more objectives are attained through emergency measures, the faith in their efficiency keeps growing. The word "emergency" begins to lose its original meaning of something expedient and extraordinary, it becomes synonymous with success and efficacy and, consequently, with a correct and normal way of doing things. People gradually get used to the extraordinary situation.

Such a strategy may well be resorted to. It has its defects, however. There will always be wise guys who will note the logical imperfection of such a policy and insist that, by definition, a state of emergency has to be called off sooner or later. And another thing: then grown accustomed to, the word "emergency" loses its impact, people cease to feel the allegedly imminent danger and those who take emergency measures are no longer looked upon as the saviours of the nation.

It is at this point that a second course of action, a second strategy, may become useful. It involves the following: as soon as the purposes for which a state of emergency has been imposed are accomplished, the nation should be told that

Drawing by Arkady Gursky

it faces another danger, and that a state of emergency has to be imposed again. The logical contradiction is successfully solved in this case. The negation of a negation results in an assertion. In relation to one emergency another emergency is normalcy.

The wise guys will have to shut up. The nation will be told that what has been regarded as an emergency situation is no longer such but is normal, as it should be. And, most importantly, a state of emergency can be declared again, if necessary, and with good reason at that.

All the above has to do with logic. And now, let me make a digression about history in order to illustrate logic. The Great October Socialist Revolution triumphed in 1917, which is common knowledge. Economic dislocation and resistance to the measures taken by the new authorities compelled the Bolsheviks to declare a state of emergency. The newspapers and the oppositon parties were banned, censorhip was introduced, and a war was declared on "speculators", hoodlums, and bandits. The process of expropriating the expropriators – parasites who sponged off the working class – was on. The All-Russian Extraordinary Commission for Fighting Counter-revolutionaries and Saboteurs – the glorious Cheka – was established.

The state of emergency was naturally regarded as a temporary expedient act. The non-Bolshevik papers were closed, and the parties of the opposition banned, for the time being, until the situation in the country returned to normal. The war on the black market was also supposed to last only for as long as the economic situation in the country remained abnormal. The speculators were to "wither away" automatically in the long run. The Extraordinary Commission itself was also initially intended to be a temporary body, as reflected in its name.

The Civil War came to a victorious end. The victory in it seemed to justify all the "extraordinary measures" taken previously. The stabilization of the economy and society in the period of the New Economic Policy apparently obviated the need for a state of emergency. Paradoxically, it turned out that calling off the state of emergency would amount to scrapping what was referred to as "the gains of Great October". Those gains simply could not exist in a situation other than a state of emergency. To call off a state of emergency would mean to return to the pre-October, or, more precisely, to the "pre-emergency" situation.

No serious leader could afford the luxury of doing that. Besides the nation was already getting used to the state of emergency. The Extraordinary Commission had gained the reputation of being the sharpest and the most reliable weapon of the proletariat, and the proletariat thought it unwise to abandon such a weapon.

There was, of course, the risk of the state of emergency being reduced to a routine, of people getting accustomed to it and taking it for granted. In order to prevent this from happening, the most serious of the leaders made a brilliant political manoeuvre. He declared a state of emergency for the second time, as an extension of the previous state of emergency.

How did it happen? The bourgeoisie's resistance was said to be mounting. Believed to be eliminated as a class by the post-October emergency measures, it survived nevertheless and, backed by its Western allies, began to offer ever fiercer resistance to the proletariat. In the process of building socialism, Stalin said, class struggle was gaining in intensity. Saboteurs and other enemies of the people were steadily growing in number, and that certainly justified the taking of emergency measures.

Everyone knows today what kind of emergency measures those were. But by announcing the intensification of the class struggle and making this intensification a "law" inherent in the process of building socialist society, Stalin made that new state of emergency a matter of routine for the socialist society. The negation of a negation produced an assertion. Stalin's "double" state of emergency became a normal socialist reality and, as a result, set the stage for any new emergency measures.

The country lived in a state of emergency for 70 years. Perestroika has called it off. And now the deputies, ministers and generals want it back. As a matter of fact, they are demanding socialism. The kind of socialism that can exist only in a state of emergency. All the rest – the need for enforcing law and order, for calming the citizens down, for regulating the economy – are mere words which are deceptive at the worst, and self-deceptive at the best.

It is, indeed, an illusion that we can enforce "law and order" in the country first, and then get down to creating a free society. A state of emergency has a logic – and a history – of its own. No matter how bizarre and extravagant this logic may seem, the history of our country confirms it. To use a formula which historical materialists like so much, the historical and the logical coincide here.

The socialist society as we know it is a state-of-emergency society. And vice versa, if a state of emergency is declared now, it will amount to the very socialism for which our ministers and generals are clamouring. The blessings of this emergency socialism are known only too well, and its logical irrelevance to our fast growing society is only too obvious.

By party we mean Polozkov

Believe it or not, I pity Polozkov. Writing lampoons and drawing cartoons is not such a complicated job, but have you ever tried to defend openly the advantages of socialism when any one of those people in line for an apartment or foodstuffs is ready to spit right in your face for your fidelity to the ideals? An act like that requires great civil valour. It's not for nothing that the most fastidious ladies of the country (in the person of Nina Andreyeva) are ready to publicly confess their love for Polozkov.

"He is not a Seneca," the ill-disposed people say about him. Sure. And not a Jean Paul Belmondo, not a Cicero. Not even a Ligachev. So what? Polozkov doesn't try to hide it. Khazanov has coped only with a cooking school, yet common people do like him. The whole proletariat does and the working peasantry, too – in part.

"Not in the right place..." some may say. But who of our leaders is in the right place, I wonder? Maybe Premier Pavlov? Or the people's deputies of Russia, nearly half of whom are ready to place the destinies of its peoples in the hands of vaudeville personages? Such is our personnel policy, intrepidly implemented in our country for seventy-odd years – until a functionary lands in a job in which he doesn't understand A from B, he will be promoted and assigned new positions, otherwise his superiors may feel they don't know A from B in their respective jobs. And when Ivan Kuzmich declares that the sacred duty of a communist is to serve where the party has placed him, he proceeds from an irrefutable Marxist thesis: positions are too numerous to be filled by Senecas.

Academician Vernadsky wrote in his secret diary as early as 1941: "The average standard of a communist – both morally and intellectually – is below the average level of outsiders... The best people of the country are in jails, in exile, or executed... The bright lights of the nation are suppressed by predators and career-making lackeys..." Naturally, the intellectual and moral standard of party functionaries has not risen since 1941. So is it reasonable to be too discerning about those who were recognized as "the best from the best" by "predators and lackeys" at their forum?



Drawing by Igor Smirnov

Generally speaking, politicians should be judged not by their external manifestations, but by their internal disposition, not by those whose mill they supply with water, but according to who eats the cakes baked from the flour which is ground at the mill, supplied with that water. Take, for instance, *Pamyat*. Democrats have worn out their tongues accusing it of antisemitism and hatred for Israel, but if you dig deeper, you'll see that the Jews ought to mold a monument of pure gold for that same *Pamyat*. Nobody has ever provided so many first-rank physicians, musicians, physicists and soldiers for Israel as the glorious Russian patriots. If I were in Alksnis' shoes, I would not fail to inquire from the competent organs about the sources financing *Pamyat* and dictating the articles for the *Molodaya Gvardia, Nash Sovremennik,* and *Moskovsky Literator*.

Likewise Polozkov should be estimated not according to his spelling, but for the good he did for his people. Judging objectively, we will have to admit that no one's effort to break down the Communist Party and compromise socialist ideas may compare with those of Polozkov. All anticommunists taken together haven't succeeded in this God-pleasing activity more than Ivan Kuzmich. His critics sling mud at him for wiping out cooperatives in Krasnodar, for disrupting the ANT's programme which might give the people 100 billion rubles worth of vitally important goods during three years, and for other trifles. Dear comrades! Disintegration of the Communist Party is worth any money! And then, cooperatives will flourish and there will be commodities in abundance if we succeed in solving this problem with Polozkov's help.

But the antipopular forces of the country seem to have thought better of it. They intend to remove our dear Ivan Kuzmich from party work before he has completely wrecked the Russian Communist Party... How about shifting him to the KGB?

Andrei Nuikin

Ribbentrop and Sorge

In July 1941, after Germany had invaded the Soviet Union, I returned from Berlin to Moscow and started working at the People's Commissariat of Foreign Affairs. Alongside other confidential documents, I handled beige pages with brief texts signed by the mysterious codename Ramsay. I could guess that the information was coming from Tokyo: it contained frequent references to Japanese sources.

Valentin Berezhkov

The circumstances of the arrest and execution of Ramsay – Richard Sorge – are well known. What is less known is Berlin's reaction to the arrest of Richard Sorge, the Tokyo correspondent of influential *Frankfurter Zeitung*, a newspaper close to official Nazi circles.

Vengeance and intrigues

The first report which the German ambassador in Tokyo, Ott, sent to to Berlin in October 23, 1941, expressed the German embassy's indignation at the arrest of Richard Sorge, the Tokyo correspondent of *Frankfurter Zeitung*. The Nazi general-ambassador regarded the Sorge arrest as the result of the intrigues of the anti-German party at the imperial court. In a coded telegram Ott described the situation in the following way:

"Richard Sorge, for many years the Tokyo correspondent of *Frankfurter Zeitung*, and another citizen of the German Reich, Max Clausen, have been arrested by the Japanese police on charges of maintaining hostile to the state ties. At the same time the police arrested a number of Japanese, one of whom is reported to have been close to the entourage of the former prime minister, Prince Konoe."

On the ambassador's insistence and "as a token of Japan's friendly disposition towards Germany" a representative of the German embassy was allowed a brief talk with Sorge. During their conversation Sorge confirmed that he had "confessed his guilt." However, as Eugen Ott noted, the confession concerned Sorge's ties with a person from the Konoe entourage, about which the German embassy had already known, and materials about Japanese-American relations, which the Japanese regarded as a state secret. Sorge had reported to the German embassy about the materials. **"That is why,"** Ott reported to Berlin, **"one may suppose that the Sorge arrest has been an act of vengeance or the result of an intrigue in which Sorge had become involved. As is known, the anti-German faction continues to possess significant influence on the police and the apparatus of the Interior Ministry and the Ministry of Justice. In this connection the Sorge arrest may have been motivated by intentions hostile to Germany."**

In conclusion Ott informed the leaders of the German foreign ministry that he insisted that the German embassy be immediately given access to the findings of the preliminary investigation, because "Germany, involved in the hard struggle against Bolshevism, attaches an extreme significance to a speedier solution of the matter."

In the initial stages of the investigation, officials in Berlin accepted the Ott interpretation of the events and believed that the Sorge arrest had been orchestrated by the anti-German party in Tokyo, and if Sorge had been collecting confidential information, he did it for Germany.

He is our correspondent, but the embassy is to blame...

Further developments were reported to the German foreign ministry in the telegram sent by Ott on November 25, 1941. This telegram cited the letter furnished by the Japanese procuracy after insistent requests from the German embassy. The letter was a secret one and contained "a review of Richard Sorge's crimes..."

"The suspect Richard Sorge... joined the Communist Party of Germany in November 1919 in the city of Hamburg. As a CPG member, he was responsible for underground propaganda, agitation and political indoctrination activities. In January 1925 Sorge attended a Moscow Comintern conference as a delegate of the central secretariat of the CPG and became a member of the Comintern's Information Department. In the spring of 1930 he was given a new assignment – to become a spy. He was sent to China where, like in many other places, he collected intellingence information for some time. After receiving an appointment to Japan, Sorge applied for an NSDAP membership and simultaneously got himself posted as the Tokyo correspondent of *Frankfurter Zeitung*. He came to Japan via the United States in the capacity of a correspondent in September 1938. Since his arrival in Japan and until his arrest, Richard Sorge was concealing his double life under the cover of an NSDAP member and a German correspondent, while actually working under Comintern control."

The letter from the Japanese procuracy scared Ambassador Ott. He did not want to believe that Sorge, with whom Ott had been very friendly, could have worked for a power other than Germany. Hoping that the Sorge case was

Valentin Berezhkov, D.Sc.(Hist.), Stalin's personal interpreter in the 1940s, a long-time *NT* staff worker



Tokyo, den 23. October 1941 5,00 Uhr
Abgangt,den 24.October 1941 4,30 Uhr

Nr. 2820 vom 23.10.

Streng geheim. Ehemaliger langjähriger Vertreter der Frankfurter Zeitung Richard Sorge und ein weiterer Reichsangehöriger Max Clausen sind von der japanischen Polizei wegen angeblicher staatsfeindlicher Verbindungen verhaftet worden. Gleichzeitig auch eine Anzahl Japaner, von denen einer der Kreis des ehemaligen Premierministers Fürst [illegible] angehören soll, arretiert worden. [illegible] bisher

[illegible] eine Anfrage handelt, [illegible] S. verstrickt worden [illegible]. Die hier tätigen, verfügt die uns nicht wohlgesinnte Gruppe beim hiesigen grossen Einfluss in Politik und innerhalb des Beamtenkörpers des Ministeriums des Aeussern und des Kriegsministeriums, sodass [illegible] deutschfeindlicher Absichten bei den Taten Sorge nicht ausgeschlossen ist.

Habe bei [illegible] Aussenministerium auf taschlenmässige Unterredung Protokolles Voruntersuchung bestanden und mich Auftrag gegeben, dass gerade Deutschland, das in schwerem Kampf mit dem Bolschewismus steht, grösstes Wert auf ungehinderte Führung legen müsse.

Ott.

The German ambassador in Tokyo, Eugen Ott, was reluctant to believe that Sorge had not been working for the Reich. In his first report to Berlin he speculated that the Sorge arrest might have been an act of vengeance or an intrigue

only a provocation, Ott requested "material evidence" from the Japanese foreign ministry. However, he notified the Gestapo representative at the embassy about the Sorge arrest.

Thus, the Sorge case started to be investigated in Germany as well. First of all the German authorities demanded explanations from the editors of *Frankfurter Zeitung*. Still unaware of the problem, the editors nonetheless deemed it wise to distance themselves from their correspondent in Tokyo and shift the blame onto the German embassy in Japan. In the letter of November 29, 1941, addressed to the German foreign ministry, one of the editors of *Frankfurter Zeitung*, Stalf, provided a detailed explanation of how his paper got involved with Sorge: **"Until March 1936 no one in the newspaper was aware of Dr. Sorge's presence in Tokyo. In March we received a letter from Dr. Sorge addressed to our Berlin-based colleague Dr. Kircher. Mr. Sorge informed us that the attention of some people in the German embassy in Japan had been attracted to the absence of a *Frankfurter Zeitung* correspondent in Tokyo. That is why Dr. Sorge took the liberty of asking us whether we might be interested in his articles on political, economic, and general problems of Japan or Manchoukou. In case we wanted more information about him, Dr. Sorge referred us to the following persons: Mr. von Etzdorf of the Reichsminister secretariat in Berlin, Ambassador von Dirksen in Tokyo, and Colonel Eugene Ott, the military attaché of the German embassy in Tokyo."**

We can see from this that Sorge had become friendly with the Otts before Eurgen Ott was promoted to full general and appointed the German ambassador to Japan: when they first met, Ott was representing the Wehrmacht in the Japanese capital.

The Abwehr steps in

The Gestapo were also dugging up Sorge's history. The following document was found among the German foreign ministry archives:

"To: Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
Confidential to Councellor Schimpke.
Berlin B.8
Wilhelmstrasse 74/76
Re: Dr. Richard Sorge, Tokyo correspondent of *Frankfurter Zeitung*, and merchant Max Clausen.
In response to the urgent letter of 5.12.41 – Act.DII2342.

One Richard Sorge residing in Solingen, Hochstrasse 23, has been known since 1927 as editor of the Communist Party newspaper *Bergische Arbeiterstimme*. According to the now available information, this is Dr. Richard Sorge, born 4.10.1895, in Baku, citizen of the Reich, arrived without police registration 1.10.33 from Berlin, Kaiserdamm 72. Married since 27.06.33. In response to oral inquiry of the Gauleiter Bureau: NSDAP Berlin informed that no Dr. Sorge was registered among the NSDAP members.

Max Clausen, born 27.02.1899. Nordstrand, citizen of the Reich, is not known to have been involved in criminal, political, or espionage activities.

The investigation continues. The results will be reported to you as soon as possible." (Signature not clear.)

As we can see, the Gestapo also wanted to shirk responsibility for its having overlooked Sorge and his assistant Clausen: "was not registered among party members," "is not known to have been engaged in political, criminal or espionage activities"...

Initially, persons conducting the investigation of the Sorge case believed they would manage to avoid unwanted publicity. However, the investigation was soon joined by Lissner, the authorized representative of the Abwehr (military intelligence and counterintelligence) at one of the German foreign missions. He informed Berlin about the rumours according to which Sorge had had access "to a very well-informed German source" at the German embassy in Tokyo which allowed Sorge to be in the know about military and political decisions of The Axis powers and to relay that information to Moscow thus incurring "a grave damage to the German and Japanese interests." "The consequences of all this are highly negative. Certain circles in the Japanese Navy are displaying an attitude which is hostile to Germany... The movement of Reich citizens in Eastern Asia is drastically restricted. Even a trip from Tokyo to Yokohama requires a special permit."

One report circulated among the Nazi bonzes said that during summer 1941 raid against Communists in Japan "a young Communist was arrested who said at the interrogation that on arriving in Tokyo she was to turn to Sorge for further instructions." However, no results were produced by subsequent shadowing of Dr. Sorge. Sorge's Japanese girlfriend, who cooperated with the Japanese police, could not report anything except that "every morning Sorge went to the German embassy, was often drunk, and wrote articles from time to time."

The Reichsminister is worried

Most of what the Abwehr representative reported to Berlin had already been known in Wilhelmstrasse. However, the Reichsminister became highly interested in the mention of "a very well-informed German source" and Sorge's fre-

quent visits to the German embassy. Rumours were already spreading in the Ribbentrop entourage concerning a special intimacy between the German ambassador's family and Sorge.

One way or another, the report worried the Reichsminister. On march 27, 1942, Ribbentrop sent a top secret coded telegram intended for the ambassador's eyes only:

"In his telegram of March 23, the Abwehr representative relayed to us a report concerning the case of Richard Sorge... In particular, it said that Sorge was in the habit of daily visiting the German embassy, receiving confidential information from a very well-informed source. At the same time Richard Sorge had worked for the Soviet Union for a number of years. Thus he inflicted grave damage to the Japanese, and particularly, German interests. The telegram also said that Richard Sorge had been sentenced to death by the military tribunal."

Ribbentrop spared no effort to make Berlin forget the Sorge case

Ribbentrop understood that his enemies in the Hitler entourage would try to use the Sorge case to discredit the Reichsminister of foreign affairs. The Ribbentrop telegram reveals that the minister was probing to find ways to justify his own activities and those of his department.

"It is my personal request that you state your position vis-à-vis this issue in a telegram addressed to me personally, if Sorge really was relaying to Moscow the information he received at the German embassy. It is absolutely imperative that I understand clearly the kind of the information Sorge had been receiving and its source. That is why I am requesting that you furnish a detailed account as to whether Sorge had confidential discussions on foreign political problems with you, as it has been insinuated. I am also awaiting your detailed explanations of how it could be possible that despite his Communist past Sorge was accepted to the NSDAP in 1934 and how he became the Tokyo correspondent of *Frankfurter Zeitung* in 1936 referring to some of the embassy staff.

I am also requesting that you furnish me with a report on to what extent your embassy and/or individual staff workers of the embassy have been discredited in the eyes of the Japanese government... After the contents of the Abwehr representative's report have become widely known here, I have to be able to either neutralize the speculations about Sorge's ties with your embassy, since the report will prove to be wrong, or to take measures to repair the inflicted damage. Ribbentrop."

Ott's self-defence

Ott must have guessed about the character of his wife's relationship with Sorge. He knew all too well who was "the very well-informed source in the German embassy." It is clear, though, that Ott could not admit what he had long guessed. That is why in his lengthy telegram to the Reichsminister dated March 29, 1942, Ott volunteered to take the responsibility.

First of all, Ott doubted the correctness of the Lissner report. The ambassador specified that contrary to the Abwehr representative's information, the death sentence had not yet been passed on Sorge and that Sorge was arrested on October 17, 1941, not in June, as Lissner believed. Ott also refuted Lissner's words that the investigation of the Sorge case had been completed. Thus, Ott tried to produce the impression that Lissner's information was based on hearsay evidence, rather than on hard facts. To finally discredit the source, Ott added that Lissner used to work in Tokyo as a representative of the official Volkischer Beobachter but was soon expelled from Japan. Ott expressed surprise at how Lissner became a foreign representative of the Abwehr.

It was not clear from the documents of the embassy and the embassy party organization, Ott wrote, how Sorge managed to get recommendations for an NSDAP membership from the local group of imperial party leadership. It was equally impossible to find out whether the embassy really recommended Sorge to the editors of *Frankfurter Zeitung.* Ott, the Embassy's military attaché at the time, reports that he received information from Sorge in the same way as the Naval attaché did.

"The information we received from Sorge was generally reliable, but it was the kind of information any well-informed journalist with connections in Japanese circles could possibly obtain... Besides, Sorge also furnished the embassy with specific information from the Konoe entourage, which I relayed to you."

By mentioning this, Ott intimated that the Reichsminister also belonged to the circle which used Sorge's "confidential information."

At the same time Ott stressed that the Sorge case had in no serious way affected his relations with the ruling Japanese elite.

"When I conveyed the New Year greetings to him, the prime minister invited me for a family gathering; the prime-minister's wife still continues cooperating with my wife in organizing assistance to Japanese soldiers. As before, I am invited for confidential dinners with cabinet members, which, as far as I know, is rather rarely done vis-à-vis heads of other diplomatic missions. State Secretary Hoshino, the closest aide to the prime minister, visited me yesterday. Prince Takamatsu, the second brother of the emperor who serves at the Naval Ministry, has told me he would willingly take part in a scientific discussion at the embassy and would stay for an intimate supper"

The Sorge case kept in the archives of the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs contains no documents about Ribbentrop's reaction to this cunning letter by general-diplomat Eugen Ott. However, it is clear that Ribbentrop spared no effort to make Berlin forget the Sorge case...

FROM THE XXth CENTURY POLITICAL THOUGHT

Introduced by *New Times* analyst **Rostislav Zolotaryov**

Every nation's history has highlights that would appear to reveal the hidden meaning of the life of generations. One such highlight in our history is undoubtedly the Revolution, and it is for the Russian to seek the answers to the questions it provoked.

The first to do so was Pyotr Struve, for whom the theme of "Russia and revolution" became the focus back in 1905. Struve was more than a perceptible analyst of these stupendous social changes which he likened to geological shifts. He was also a leading personage in this historical drama. Thus he was lashed by Cossack knouts when he demonstrated in 1901 outside Kazan Cathedral in St. Petersburg to shield students from tsarist club law. He was again sniped at by the new proletarian dictatorship, when during the Civil War after the 1917 revolt he wholly dedicated himself to resisting Bolshevism.

Today, when Russia is trying once again to throw off the chains of bondage, it is particularly important to learn more about the ideas and activities of those social figures who could point the way for our sick and as yet still "immature" society, with "preserved faith and fidelity, honour and honesty, and adamant firmness at a time of facillation, spinelessness, ambiguity and betrayal," as S. Bulgakov said of Struve.

The essay that follows was written shortly after the Bolshevik revolt.

Indeed, Struve demonstrates the Russian's mettle. Boris Savinkov's metaphorical "cheating God-carrier" alludes to all social castes, not only the "common folk," "deified" in the past 19th century. No wonder this one and only politically creative mind in Russia, as Berdyayev called him, devoted the entire power of his talent to researching the "sources and meaning" of the Russian revolution. He regarded its basic content as a negation of the country's two highly significant cultural achievements, namely the "embryo of a constitutional system," implying one of pluralistic democracy, and the "embryo of popular landed ownership," implying private ownership of the land. He qualifies the 1917 revolution exclusively as socio-economic, political, and cultural regression, a point it is particularly important to realize, especially as regards those who champion the "socialist choice," those who claim that Russia has her own road in history to follow, to wit without democracy and private ownership and hence without freedom.

The publication below was prepared by Yuri Pivovarov, Cand.Sc.(Hist.)

Revolution and counterrevolution

Pyotr Struve (1870–1944)

Viewing the 1917 events in detachment from the entire preceding epoch, we find it impossible to honour them with the title of revolution. It was a soldiers' mutiny, which "out of politics" was accepted by the country's intelligentsia as a revolution in the hope of transforming this mutiny into a revolution. This hope was not fated to materialize: the mutiny became not a glorious revolution, but a stupendous ignominous Russia-wide pogrom.

Yet this Russia-wide pogrom is, from a deeper historical angle, merely an episode in a movement that began not in 1917, and that does end there. The Russian revolution traces its beginnings not from the soldier and worker rebellion in St.Petersburg in February-March 1917, which gradually developed into the Russia-wide pogrom we are currently experiencing, and it will not end with this pogrom. The Russian revolution started much earlier, at least in 1902. In 1905–06 it scored much greater victories than it did in 1917. It will not end with this eight-months long pogrom, that we have experienced.

The tragedy Russia is going through is due to the insanity of the dethroned monarchy and the folly of the public movement even to its more moderate elements, which combined to bring about revolutionary developments at home during the greatest and worst of wars, one which mobilized a vast army. For its external aims the state needed this vast army, which revolution transformed into a scourge for the population imperilling the state's very mainstays. Enfeebled and trapped in the coils of this contradiction is a great once powerful state: we still do not know how it will extricate itself therefrom. However, a way out must be found – which is plainly the entire further content of the Russian revolution.

This being so, we shall understand why the pogrom chapter experienced in the revolution that began 15 years back, cannot terminate in the Constituent Assembly whose wartime convocation was required by the threats of the intoxicated "revolutionaries" and the maddened soldiers. Neither acute nor chronic pogroms can be cured by parliamentary speech and decision making.

The revolution that Russia entered in 1902 is one which simultaneously builds the new political and socio-economic forms of life. The process is proceeding painfully for Russia because by virtue of different causes all the elements which it behooved to energetically build these new forms of life, have proved historically incapable of doing so. The world war expedited the emergence of revolution and its degeneration into a pogrom. But is was not this war that engendered it or determined the basic features of the forces active in revolution. The war did not give birth to revolution, while peace as such will by no means result in its consummation and the transfer to new guidelines for Russia's political and socio-economic life. It is essential for us to fully understand this, so as not to succumb to illusions about the significance of such events as the convocation of the

Constituent Assembly or even the achieving of peace.

I have established the first paradox relevant to the situation in which we have found ourselves.

To end both external and the civil war, Russia needs a large armed force under the firm controll of state authority. But due to a range of causes arising in the process of revolution this army has become an organized pogrom club law effected by armed men under the leadership of criminals and madmen.

However, involved in the developments through which Russia is passing is another, still deeper paradox. The revolution that began in 1902 gained two indisputable achievements that were pregnant with immense cultural consequences for Russia. These were, one, the embryo of a constitutional system in the shape of popular representation and free press, and, the other, the embryo of popular land ownership engenered by Stolypin's agrarian reforms. In the stage we are going through now, that of a worker-peasant rebellion excited by "socialist" slogans, the revolution is spearheaded against the embryo of a Russian constitution for what, in its political sense is Bolshevism and sundry semi-Bolshevism if not the struggle against Russia's constitutional transformations initiated in the first decade of this twentieth century?! At the same time this entire supposedly "socialist" rebellion is a wholesale negation of ownership and law and order founded on the recognition and shielding of ownership. But this revolution as a revolution is motivated by nothing else than the aspirations for property ownership: it is, as it were, an immense popular convulsion from whose travail there should emerge in Russia a regime based on private ownership, firstly landed ownership by the broad popular masses, and on their indoctrination with ownership tendencies and tastes. I had planned to tell our socialist revolutionaries in the Council of the Republic that their battle cry, "In struggle you will gain your right" will be remade in their own way by history and the Russian peasantry, who will tag on the small but rather essential amendment to have it read as: "In struggle you will gain your right to your own property."

Russian socialism in its struggle against... the bourgeois order is, in effect, counter-revolutionary

Indeed, the assertion that the revolution since 1902 is a bourgeois revolution is more than a literary phrase. However, it does not at all entail that the revolution's blessings accrue only to the so-called "bourgeoisie" and that the bourgeois system will be established in its interests. This revolution is a bourgeois revolution because despite all the socialist battle cries and slogans behind them the popular masses are in everything they do seeking to entrench in their own life bourgeois principles, above all the beginnings of personal landed ownership. Let us presume that the landed estates will totally disappear. In that case it will distinctly be seen that the whole of Russian agrarian socialism is nothing but intellectual ravings couched within which is the desire for bourgeoisification by the economically stronger and sturdier peasant elements. Even inspite of the entire bolshevist swashing up of Russia's economy, this pseudo-socialist wave of peasant-worker bourgeoisification, insafar as it will create precisely bourgeois life and interests amongst the popular masses, will when the "socialist" fever passes develop into the mainstay of property ownership and safeguarded law and order based on acknowledgement of such ownership. Currently the "socialist" pogrom wave appears to be revolution: actually it is not revolution but a concealed powerful bourgeoisification that will inevitably enter into conflict with it. Then the socialist wave will show what it really amounts to, that repugnant pogrom garb in which the creation of a new popular bourgeois Russia is temporarily clothed. This powerful process of the bourgeoisification of property ownership awareness amongst the broad masses will eventually completely shed the disfiguring pogrom socialist garb. At the same time the intelligentsia will eventually fully repudiate socialism as a pogrom ideology that is counter-revolutionary in essence, that in Russia's present conditions goes against state and culture.

So if the revolution Russia is experiencing is, indeed cannot help but be, a bourgeois revolution in its deepest meaning, then the indisputable conclusion that follow is that Russian socialism in its struggle against the bourgeoisie and the bourgeois order is, in effect, counter-revolutionary and should be surmounted and swept away in the historical development of Russia's own broad popular masses. For every socialist who has gone through an evolutionary, more specifically and especially a Marxian school, this cannot but be absolutely plain. Though the process of surmounting the counter-revolutionary anarchy of socialism in Russia's revolution will be, of course, most knotty and painful. It is irrevocable and, generally, its painfulness is also inevitable, which it behooves Russia's intelligentsia to distinctly realize right now. Only through a clear perception of the sociological substance of the road that Russia will take, indeed, cannot but take that road of creating a generall human culture in its bourgeois forms, – will Russia's intelligentsia atone for its perhaps involuntary but tremendous sin, that, on the one hand of its active touting socialism and, on the other hand, of its connivance with this touting, thus infecting with the poison of pogroms, the Russian people's socio-political struggle for emancipation. It is this contamination that has shaken the Russian state's powerful age-old edifice so much so that it threatens to collapse and to crush and mangle Russian culture.

I know that it has become habitual to accuse either the old order and the old authority or the Bolsheviks for all the troubles we are now going through. I would be the last to vindicate the old authority that striving to preserve its superannuated prerogatives criminally retarded the nation's cultural and political advancement. My attitude towards the Bolsheviks is also known well enough. However, should one be so inclined as to qualify the the all-Russian pogrom of 1917 as the Russian revolution I will say straight out that the old authority's basic crime is its having paved the way for this revolution, having made it inevitable. To be fair though, one must add that involved in this crime is all of Russia's progressive intelligentsia by virtue of the Godless, reckless role it imparted to its struggle against the old order, especially after the events of 1905.

This all shows why inherent in revolution, even nesting in its very core, is the contagion of counterrevolution, which up to its last breath will pompously style itself as revolution. It is absolutely unimportant what this pogrom contagion will be named when crushed. Yet, it must be crushed and cauterized out of Russia's life come what may.

PETROGRAD
November 23, 1917

■

His friends were hardly surprised when Lieutenant Colonel **Grigory Alimurzaev** combined his military career with leading the Rostov School of Strategy of Socio-Intellectual Business.

The reason was not just his character, but also the specifics of his specialization – with a degree in economics, Professor Alimurzaev also has experience in teaching. However, the school he founded is not very concerned about students. Its fundamental orientation is the influence on public opinion.

One of the most promising projects is the all-around research on the problem of security. Alimurzaev directs that line of research along with **Alexei Pankin,** Cand.Sc.(History) and the assistant to the senior editor of the magazine *International Affairs*. Among some of the group's concrete accomplishments are: "Independent Social Expertise on the State of the Military Threat and Activities of the Soviet Armed Forces" (Moscow, January 1990), public forum "Border Control in the System of Security" (Rostov-on-the-Don, June 1990), and the international discussion "Who on Earth Needs Outer Space?" (Moscow, February 1991).

Alimurzaev and Pankin are now preparing an international business marathon called "The Southern Russian Renaissance: People, Projects, Programs, Structures." The marathon is intended as a long-term experiment and is expected to last several years. The first tour will be in October, when a group of participants from different countries will spend 15 days cruising through southern Russia.

* * *

Soviet medic **Alla Umanskaya** is the brain behind the original system of self-control of the human body. She believes that this new method might be used to fight the Spanish flu epidemic, which will pose a threat to many countries in the near future.

Umanskaya, Cand.Sc. (Med.), is the head of a prognostical, preventive medicine, and rehabilitation laboratory in the Moscow I.M.Sechenov Medical Academy.

In the beginning of the 70's, working as the head doctor in one of the rural polyclinics in the Donbas, Umanskaya was in charge of conducting health exams for several thousand families of miners and kolhoz workers. She uncovered the here-to-fore undescribed system of pathology, which was subsequently titled ENEID. The first stage of this disease shows up, as a rule, in children born after the flu

The Youngest Rector

Prime Minister and President of the Council Felipe Gonzalez of Spain, is opening summer courses of the Universidad Complutense de Madrid in Moscow. Students will discuss such problems as the transition from a planned economy to a market economy, advertising and the market, money, banks, financial markets, Europe and telecommunications... This was all organized in Moscow by the rector of the Universidad Complutense de Madrid, **Gustavo Villapalos.**

The popularity that Villapalos enjoys as the rector of the most prominent institution of higher education is envied by many of the country's politicians. The whole life story of this brilliant scholar and highly visible public figure looks like a growth chart without dips or curves.

After graduating from the university with flying colours, he stayed on in the law history department, as was his right, and at the age of 26 earned the title of professor. At 34 Villapalos became the youngest dean in the history of the department, and after three years he became the rector of the Complutense. He was elected to the post by a landslide, through the support of conservative and left-wing radical professors alike. Last year he was again elected to the position. Gustavo has received honorary doctorates from a full dozen universities. By this table of rank, he should practically be King of Spain.

His workday sometimes lasts as long as 15 to 16 hours, but according to him, he doesn't feel fatigue. After becoming the rector, Gustavo Villapalos "built" new buildings for the mathematics and biology departments as well as a library, which contains half a million books. Under his care a science center for nuclear-magnetic resonance and electronic microscopy was opened and apartments were constructed for the university's professors and employees. And at the time of Gorbachev's visit to Spain last fall, the opening ceremony of the building of the Soviet Institute of Culture and Science took place.

Gustavo says about the upcoming summer courses in Moscow: "I stick to the belief that universities' activities don't have to be locked into pure academic constraints. Our university has already conducted courses over summer vacation for four years now. These courses attract prominent scholars, political figures, writers, artists, actors, representatives of business quarters from all over the world. This year we decided to broaden the geographical base of summer courses, which have usually been held at San Lorenzo del Escorial outside Madrid. If you don't count last year's experiment in Berlin, the courses conducted in the city on the Moscow River will be our first experience abroad. I will give the primary position in the upcoming discussion to a topic that is very important to the USSR, today such as the experience of the transitional period in the policy of the structure of the government of Spain. Alfonso Guerra, the First Deputy to the General Secretary of the Socialist Workers' Party of Spain, will lead these courses.

Among those who will guest lecture in the capital of the Soviet Union are Jordi Sole Tura, the Minister of Culture of Spain, Nobel Prize winner Camilo José Cela, and Marcelino Oreja Aquirre, former Minister of Foreign Affairs...

Valery Volkov,
MADRID

epidemic to parents who suffered from illnesses of the respiratory system and of the ears, nose, and throat.

Umanskaya's method was used in the acute stage of the viral illness as well as during the absence of clear signs of the disease. The results of everyday point massage of the major biologically active zones of the human body bring about self-regulation – certain substances are produced, which are superior to any man-made medicine.

Umanskaya several times sent her observations to government organizations, from the city town committee of the Communist Party to the Ministry of Public Health of the USSR, but the answer was a deaf silence. In 1979 she received an author's certificate on her method of treatment of the flu, acute respiratory disease and their complications... By the middle of the 1980's, the Ministry of Public Health accepted her method, but that didn't make anything easier for her. And now, after creating the medical scientific-production cooperative firm "Umanskaya," the medic is looking for sponsors.

D.Polikarpov

* * *

The concerts of the famous German pianist **Holger Groschopp** took place in Leningrad.

The 27-year-old pianist first sat behind a piano at the age of six. By the age of 10, he was the winner of an international piano competition. He studied at the West Berlin High School of Art. Among his teachers was the well-known baritone Dietrich Fischer-Diskau.

In the west Groschopp became famous for his performance of the seldom-played works of Skryabin, Busoni, and Brahms. Out of the modern composers he plays Boulez, Luciano Berio, Messiaen, and Henze. German newspapers write of the "charge of magic" and the "feeling of style" in his playing, and of his "turn to late romanticism."

Holger himself says, "I prefer the lesser-known, using it to increase my professional capabilities in music. The first interpretation always establishes some kind of canon, which can't be considered in the subsequent executions. When something is played for the first time, it is impossible to foretell, what shape its future will take.

D.Kadantsev

Pronozin under investigation

When Aleksandr got to the head of the line in the area district Visa and Registration Department, he was followed into the office by three plainclothesmen and asked: "Pronozin? Why didn't you serve in the army?" And not waiting for an answer, "Get on out..."

Three years ago, in the summer of 1988, when he was 17, **Aleksandr Pronozin** sent a letter to Marshal Yazov, the Minister of Defense of the USSR, in which he declared his refusal to serve in the military and declared himself to be a conscientious objector. The letter requests that he be allowed to substitute service in any civilian branch in place of service in the Soviet Army. As a result, the procurator of the Soviet district of Moscow instituted Criminal Case No. 65707. From that time on Pronozin actively joined the fight for the exemption for conscientious objectors from military service, and succeeded in publishing material on that theme in the USSR (*New Times*, No. 10/91) as well as abroad. All that time he was a witness for the prosecution.

Charges were brought up three days after Pronozin returned from Belgium where he went as a member of the delegation under the aegis of the USSR Supreme Soviet to study West European experience in alternative service.

"I knew from the beginning what was in store for me," said Aleksandr. "I wish I could solve this problem in a much less painful way – there are all kinds of clever ways that would allow me to get out of military service. It was even suggested that I ask another government for political asylum. But the point is that this isn't just my own personal problem..."

Pronozin is against the tactics of self-sacrifice and treats martyrs to high ideals with skepticism. However, he believes that in the obtained situation, "it is an open hearing of the case that is capable of clearly demonstrating the striking contradiction between a simple promise, on the one hand, and concrete practice, on the other."

"I hope that on the threshold of the session of the Conference on the Humane Dimension of CSCE to be held in Moscow in September of this year, this process will expedite lawful decision of the problem."

Meanwhile the investigation of Pronozin's case continues. He gave his written undertaking not to leave the place. Henri Reznik, member of the Moscow-Helsinki group, has agreed to serve as his lawyer.

When 79-year-old French film actor **José Ferrer** first saw **Gérard Depardieu,** he said: "You will be the definitive Cyrano de Bergerac." His words turned out to be prophetic. Shortly afterward, the 42-year-old Depardieu received a D.W. Griffith film award for his performance in the lead role in the film Cyrano de Bergerac. He considers himself the successor to Ferrer, who in 1950 won an Oscar for playing the part of... Cyrano de Bergerac.

Depardieu began his acting career early. He first appeared on the screen at the age of 18. He has currently acted in more than 40 films and a great number of TV series. He calls Ferrer his "good-luck charm."

True, not long ago Depardieu almost kissed his popularity goodbye. When he was filming in the US, he gave an imprudent interview about the love adventures of his youth. The major women's organizations immediately announced: women don't need this kind of idol. Depardieu was forced to apologize.

Now the critics are arguing over which de Bergerac is better – Ferrer of the 50's or Depardieu of the 90's. "We are not fighting for a prize," reasons Ferrer.

Konstantin Shukhnov

The Bolshevik grandfather and the Constitutional Democrat son-in-law

If only we had a Moses of our own who would lead us out of slavery...

Ivan Yelistratov



Many, if not most of us, think that big politics is made up in the Kremlin or some such places. We follow with a great deal of interest and emotion the goings on at sessions and congresses telecast from there, and react to them like soccer fans (soccer being the only other show which doesn't leave us cold). "Now Alksnis is making a right-wing thrust... Making a well-aimed shot... Who's minding the goal? Shevardnadze? I'm afraid he won't catch the ball, he's too liberal... Oh, look, he's made a save, and now Belozertsev is dribbling fast along the left-wing edge of the pitch in counter-attack... Will he break through? He has passed the ball to Murashev and this one sure knows how to shoot!"

The following morning, we go to work, dragging our feet, disappointed with another tie. Tikhonov has never succeeded in persuading Sukhov, trembling with the premonition of capitalism, that the system the latter lives under has no name at all. And Yazov has never managed to prove to Boldyrev that the army should defend the socialist choice rather than the geographic space where the very people the army is united with has the misfortune of living...

And few of us realize that in the current political struggle the line of demarcation lies not along the congress hall seats but across our kitchen table. Yes, that's right, across our good old kitchen table covered with a faded oil cloth and dominated by a tea-cosy. And that all our perestroika pluralism, now splashed all over newspaper pages and TV screens, over congress halls and city squares, has had its start right here, at this table...

The most bitter clashes take place in the family. Nothing can be harder than trying to convince your father, a CPSU member of 50 years standing, that the Communists' economic programmes are worthless, or to prove to your son, a Social Democrat, that he is a traitor and a slanderer of our glorious history.

Unfortunately, I see my parents only a few times a year, and my every visit to their kitchen is accompanied by political skirmishes.

The heralds of the coming "emancipation" cite, in support of their arguments, the legend about Moses who shepherded the Jewish people around the desert for forty years until the last of those who had been born slaves breathed their last. This is a vivid example, but it, alas, does not apply to us. Those Jews were humane and merciful enough to wait for forty years instead of solving the problem at a faster rate by simply killing those born slaves; they would have saved some 15–20 years that way... As one reads the numerous slogans like "Enough!" "Step down!" "To the garbage heap!" "To the pillory!" "We shan't miss!" – one begins

to have his misgivings about our people's tolerance.

And still we have to learn to live with the Bolshevik grandfather, with the Stalinist mother-in-law, with the Constitutional Democrat son-in-law, with the Monarchist grandson and with the neutral wife who is showing an ever more strongly pronounced tendency for absolute tyranny because of your salary which she considers beggarly.

I admit that I'm rather proud of my father who is a Communist and a Party worker of fifty years standing. Nevertheless, he has long told me things for which, had I been a Pavlik Morozov, he would have paid dearly then, and in Polozkov's party today. When I hear demands that the CPSU should be put on trial, I don't quite see whom, specifically, we are supposed to put in the dock. Kaganovich, who has his one foot in the grave? Our late leaders of old? Our own selves – "members" and "candidate members" – who still shudder at the memory of the square-jawed chairman of the district Party commission eyeing you suspiciously, as if you were potential enemy of the people, a dissident or an anti-Sovietist only because you were a journalist or a research worker?

Or my father, who has been on pension for almost a decade now after twenty-five years as a secretary of a Party committee, but whose advice and help are still sought by those who, there being no church in their settlement, still regard him as not so much a Party official as a priest?

My mother, not a Party member, had only seven years of elementary schooling before the war and was then too busy coping with wartime hardships and raising her children to continue her education. She is as much a product of the times as the rest of us. If any of the deputies of any faction wish to hear the voice of the people, let them go to my mother. She will tell them all about the political views of the people they profess such a loving care for.

He will learn that she, like millions of her compatriots, has trembled with anxiety upon learning about a new American submarine having gone into service (not knowing, of course, that the ratio of submarines was three to one in our favour). He will learn that she has shed bitter tears over the Vietnamese child victims of American combat action (she has no way of knowing about the Afghan child victims of our own combat action – Soviet television does not show them!) She will tell the deputy that there has been more to eat under Brezhnev (she knows what she is talking about because she is in charge of drawing the family's meager rations today)... She will add that under no circumstances should private ownership of land be allowed because this would lead to bloody "kitchen garden war" like the one fought after the Revolution with some members of our family killed in it.

The deputy will hear her complain that "we have lost our socialist countries." This has been inculcated in all of us. And finally, "If only there would be no war!"

Is it easy to engage in a political discussion with such an opponent?

It isn't. And one shouldn't.

How are you going to make your point in such a discussion? Using the information you've gleaned from various archives the Party and the KGB have grudgingly declassified with a contemptuous grin? My mother has never seen these archives, and hardly has any use for them. She knows what our life is like from personal experience.

She can tell you, without consulting any archives, who were pinched, and when, although she doesn't know what they were pinched for. "They were the enemies of the people," and that's that. She will tell what it is like to live in Nazi-occupied territory, that was the most horrible experience of her life. As a teenage girl, she lived through an interminable three-year ordeal of the Nazi regime in Vinnitsa where the occupiers behaved worse towards the local residents than any place else: the notorious Werwolf, Hitler's "field headquarters," was within 15 km of the city. I was there on several occasions, saw the havoc made of the bunker by bombs and shells which, curiously, spared the swimming-pool rumoured to have been used by Eva Braun; and I drove along the German-built motor roads left intact by all the post-war years. But that was much later. The Nazis had pulled my mother, then a girl of 14, out of her house thrice, with only her night gown on, to the snow-swept backyard where a firing squad was waiting. They shot every tenth hostage, she escaped death by the skin of her teeth twice, and when the fatal count fell on her, a man changed places with her on the sly. He didn't give his name.

So much for that period in her life, my mother's fate is like those of millions, some had it worse still. Is it easy to get the better of such a person in a political discussion? I didn't try to pursuade her of anything. I simply asked: "Mother, why did grand-dad die so early in life? At 36?"

My grand-dad had owned (Communists, hold your breath!) eight hectares of fields and woodland. He ran a shop in the village, and traded in salt which he had brought all the way from the Crimea by bullock-drawn carts. He kept cows, sheep, horses, bullocks, and so on. My grandmother was married into his family which was regarded as a prosperous one. They already had seven children when collectivization struck. Over my grandmother's fierce resistance, they took the cattle, the grain, the woodlands, everything away from the family overnight. Had she not died ten years ago, at the age of 90, my grandma would have told me how they managed to survive the famine which followed the great leap into socialism. I wish I had asked her.

Well, should I approve my grandfather's choice? Should I, in that case, die in the prime of life, as he did because he failed to do justice to the "greatness" of collectivization? He considered it unfair to be compelled to make a choice at gunpoint. He died within a year of being deprived of his land and cattle, he couldn't bear the "blessings" of the slave-driving collective farm system, and his heart packed up. He dropped dead at 36!

They say that the subjunctive mood cannot be applied to history, because what has been, has been. My mother has lived the sort of life which has fallen to her lot, and had no option.

And still... Had it not been for the Great October Revolution... Had it not been for the collectivization of our life... The granddad would have made good, and his family would have had not a care in the world. My mother, who had shown outstanding ability for drawing and sewing, wouldn't have to draw on scraps of wrapping paper in school; she would certainly have gotten a good education and would have gained a worthier place in life, although she says she is well contented with what she has now. There probably would have been no war, either. My mother wouldn't have faced firing squads in the dead of night, and my father, instead of flying risky bombing missions on board his wonderful Boston aircraft, would have gone to a University somewhere... Would that other life, which never came, have been worse than the one we have today?

That's what I told mother.

Having considered what I said, she replied:

"That's right. Things wouldn't have been worse." That was the long and short of it.

Making this admission cost her a no mean effort. She has absolute faith in what the newspapers say, and today's pluralism puzzles her: "Which of them is the liar I wonder?" Mother thinks she is quite well-off today. "I've got my kitchen garden, and I've got my chicken, so what more could I want? My pension buys me all the bread I need."

Knowing how much effort my parents put into that kitchen garden and into raising their grandchildren, knowing the size of their pension and what the state of their health is, I keep asking myself: why, oh why are we so loyal to our choice? If we had a Moses of our own who would undertake to lead us out of slavery without revolutionizing our economic relations, only a few of us, "born free," would have made it to the "radiant future," because grain would not grow in the collective-farm desert...

Lie flat on your back and enjoy it?

Leonid Ionin

Recently I had a talk with a colleague on the topical social subject of prostitution. He is of the opinion that the mass media mislead their readers and viewers by saying that prostitution is impossible to deal with.

I didn't take any notes, therefore I can only convey the general meaning of what he said. Here it is.

"Newspaper and television disputes on whether the sale of one's body is moral or immoral are going on and on. Only subjective evidence is adduced in support of either argument, therefore the problem looks insoluble. In order to solve it, we've got to realize first that this is an economic problem, not a moral. The commandment 'Thou shalt not commit adultery' does not apply here, because a prostitute and her client do not commit adultery but make a business deal. Any sound economic theory will tell you that it is moral to sell what belongs to you, and immoral to sell what does not. This is enshrined in moral commandments ('thou shalt not steal') and in the relevant clauses of the criminal code. But since one's body cannot be stolen, its sale cannot be immoral. For the same reason this sale is not punishable under the said code.

"All this talk about immorality misleads citizens and society. A so-called anti-prostitution campaign is in progress. Since there isn't, and couldn't possibly be any legal provision to that effect, the campaign is based wholly on moral principles. The wretched girls are hunted for in hotels, at railway stations, in places where foreigners are concentrated. Previously, they used to be banished to remote places. Now they are not, but kept an eye on lest they should meet with prospective clients.

"As a matter of fact, this means distancing buyers from sellers. Some have a commodity to sell, others have the money and the desire to buy. But the twain are prevented from meeting. From the economic view-point, this is just another absurdity. It is sufficient just to read articles by Selyunin or Strelyany to see that this is so. Besides, this contradicts the whole spirit of our reforms. This 'preventive' effort takes a lot of the law enforcement agencies' and public organizations' time.

"Let us now look at another aspect of the matter – the prostitutes are fined. This is right, this goes to show that the law enforcemnt agencies have a 'scent.' But the legislator is inconsistent, he is kind of afraid of being consistent. For how does he motivate the fine? Is it an anti-prostitution measure? This looks like the encouragement of public prejudice. Actually, this is a tax. A tax exacted, which is as random and irregular as the seller-buyer contacts are. And there certainly turn up certain enterprising men – like pimps, racketeers, and some dishonest policemen – who do what the state taxation services are supposed to. Crime is rising, the girls are out of work, the clients are nervous, and the state budget suffers..."

Having heard out these unexpected arguments, I asked my interviewee what he had to suggest. It turned out that he wanted to cast all the talk about the immorality of prostitution aside and to put prostitution under state control. This could be done by setting up a vice squad which can be assigned the functions of a taxation service. In this way, he told me, we shall cope with prostitution. A normal and legal sale of the body will no longer be regarded as crime. Prostitution will cease to exist as a social evil and will become a decent and respectable occupation.

All this sounded rather reasonable. But somewhat ironic, too. I just couldn't take it seriously. That is, until I saw recently in *Izvestia* an article under the banner headline "Free Love Made Legal." That, I thought, was a manifestation of free thinking on the pages of a national paper.

The content of the article disappointed me, however. The interviewee, a high-ranking policeman, pounced upon "prostitutes parasiting upon the tidal wave of free love," upon "the gays," and said that all that filth had to be cracked down on. He spoke about the need for "preventing and cutting short the crimes in the sphere of public morality," and I saw at once that the colonel thought in old terms and that the ideas of the modern economic world outlook were alien to him.

The colonel referred to Western experience. It is common knowledge, however, that the Western vice squads have failed to carry out their mission. Confronted with a wealthy and lawless world of prostitution, police became increasingly corrupt. Registration, which police squads were mainly engaged in, led to labelling women as prostitutes forever. In the West, this sphere is also marked by crime, looseness, moral and legal ambiguity.

In a word, the colonel's determination to "put an end to this filthy practice" failed to infect me. Neither did the arguments of my learned colleague. Because moral indignation cannot be called off by logical arguments. It can easily stand opposition, but it gets worse the more often this opposition manifests itself. The rougher the sea of the free-market economy, the more dangerous the reef of public indignation which prevents the "wretched girls" from making it to the solid earth of a legal coexistence with the client.

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

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